



A Deductive Verification Infrastructure for Probabilistic Programs

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This paper presents a quantitative program verification infrastructure for discrete probabilistic programs. Our infrastructure can be viewed as the probabilistic analogue of Boogie: its central components are an intermediate verification language (IVL) together with a real-valued logic. Our IVL provides a programming-language-style for expressing verification conditions whose validity implies the correctness of a program under investigation. As our focus is on verifying quantitative properties such as bounds on expected outcomes, expected run-times, or termination probabilities, off-the-shelf IVLs based on Boolean first-order logic do not suffice. Instead, a paradigm shift from the standard Boolean to a *real-valued* domain is required.

Our IVL features quantitative generalizations of standard verification constructs such as assume- and assert-statements. Verification conditions are generated by a weakest-precondition-style semantics, based on our real-valued logic. We show that our verification infrastructure supports natural encodings of numerous verification techniques from the literature. With our SMT-based implementation, we automatically verify a variety of benchmarks. To the best of our knowledge, this establishes the first deductive verification infrastructure for expectation-based reasoning about probabilistic programs.

CCS Concepts: • **Theory of computation** → **Logic and verification; Automated reasoning; Hoare logic; Axiomatic semantics; Denotational semantics; Invariants; Program specifications; Pre- and post-conditions; Program verification; Assertions.**

Additional Key Words and Phrases: deductive verification, quantitative verification, probabilistic programs, weakest preexpectations, real-valued logics, automated reasoning

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1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Probabilistic programs differ from ordinary programs by the ability to base decision on samples from probability distributions. They are found in randomized algorithms, communication protocols, models of physical and biological processes, and – more recently – statistical models used in machine

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


Fig. 1. Architecture of our verification infrastructure.

learning and artificial intelligence (cf. [Barthe et al. 2020; Gordon et al. 2014]). Typical questions in the design and analysis of probabilistic programs are concerned with *quantifying* aspects of their *expected* – or average – *behavior*, e.g. the *expected runtime* of a randomized algorithm, the *expected number of retransmissions* in a protocol, or the *probability* that a particle reaches its destination.

Writing correct probabilistic programs is notoriously hard. They may contain subtle bugs occurring with low probability or undesirably favor certain results in the long run. In fact, reasoning about the expected behavior of probabilistic programs is known to be strictly harder than for ordinary programs [Kaminski et al. 2019].

There exists a plethora of research on verification techniques for probabilistic programs, ranging from program logics (cf. [Kaminski et al. 2018; McIver and Morgan 2005]) to highly specialized proof rules [Hark et al. 2019; McIver et al. 2018], often with little (if any) automation. These techniques are based on different branches of mathematics – e.g. domain theory or martingale analysis – and their relationships are non-trivial (cf. Takisaka et al. [2021]). This poses major challenges for comparing – let alone *combining* – such different approaches.

In this paper, we build a *verification infrastructure* for reasoning about the expected behavior of (discrete) probabilistic programs; Figure 1 gives an overview. Modern program verifiers for non-probabilistic programs often have a front-end that translates a given program and its specification into an intermediate language, such as BOOGIE [Leino 2008], WHY3 [Filliâtre and Paskevich 2013], or VIPER [Müller et al. 2016b]. Such intermediate languages enable the encoding of complex verification techniques, while allowing for the separate development of efficient back-ends, e.g. verification condition generators. In this very spirit, we introduce a novel *quantitative intermediate verification language* that enables researchers to (i) prototype and automate new verification techniques, (ii) combine proof rules, and (iii) benefit from back-end improvements. Before we dive into details, we discuss five examples of probabilistic programs from the literature that have been verified with five different techniques – all of them have been encoded in our language and verified with our tool.

Example 1.1 (Rabin’s Mutual Exclusion Protocol [Kushilevitz and Rabin 1992]). This protocol controls processes competing for access to a critical section. To determine which process gets access, every process will repeatedly toss a fair coin until it sees heads; the process that needed the largest number of tosses is then granted access. Figure 2 shows a probabilistic program modeling Rabin’s protocol: i is the number of remaining processes competing for access. While more than 1 competitor remains, each competitor tosses one coin (inner loop). If the coin shows heads (i.e. if $\text{flip}(0.5)$ samples a 1), that competitor is removed from the pool of remaining competitors (by subtracting $d = 1$ from i). One can verify with the *weakest liberal preexpectation calculus* by

```

while (1 < i) {
  n := i;
  while (0 < n) {
    d := flip(0.5);
    i := i - d;
    n := n - 1
  }
}

```

Fig. 2. Model of Rabin's Protocol

```

while (0 < x) {
  i := N + 1;
  while (0 < x < i) {
    i ≈ unif(1, N)
  }
  x := x - 1
}

```

Fig. 3. The Coupon Collector's Problem

```

fn lossy(l: List) {
  if (len(l) > 0) {
    { lossy(tail(l)) } [0.5] { diverge }
  }
}

```

Fig. 4. Lossy list traversal

```

while (x > 0) {
  q := x / (2 * x + 1);
  {x := x - 1} [q] {x := x + 1}
}

```

Fig. 5. Variant of a random walk

```

while (x ≠ 0) {
  {x := 0} [0.5] {y := y + 1}
  n := n + 1
}

```

Fig. 6. Counterexample from [Hark et al. 2019]

McIver and Morgan [2005] that *the probability to select exactly one process (plus the probability of nontermination) is at least $2/3$ if there are initially at least 2 processes.*

Example 1.2 (The Coupon Collector [Wikipedia 2023a]). Figure 3 models the coupon collector problem – a well-known problem in probability theory: Suppose any box of cereals contains one of N different coupons. What is the average number of boxes one needs to buy to collect at least one of all N different coupons, assuming that each coupon type occurs with the same probability? Our formulation is taken from [Kaminski et al. 2018]; the authors develop an *expected runtime calculus* and use *invariant-based arguments* to show that the *expected number of loop iterations*, which coincides with the average number of boxes one needs to buy, is *bounded from above by $N \cdot H_N$* , where H_N is the N -th harmonic number.

Example 1.3 (Lossy List Traversal [Batz et al. 2019]). Figure 4 depicts a recursive function implementing a lossy list traversal; it flips a fair coin (using the probabilistic choice $\{\dots\} [0.5] \{\dots\}$) and, depending on the outcome, either calls itself with the list's tail or diverges, i.e. enters an infinite loop. Using the *weakest preexpectation calculus* [Kozen 1983; McIver and Morgan 2005], one can prove that this program terminates with probability *at most* $0.5^{\text{len}(l)}$. Analyzing the lossy list traversal is intuitive – for every non-empty list, there is exactly one execution that does not diverge; its probability is $0.5^{\text{len}(l)}$. What is noteworthy, however, is that even for such a simple program, we need to reason about an exponential function. This is common when verifying probabilistic programs: proving non-trivial bounds often requires non-linear arithmetic.

Example 1.4 (Fair Random Walk [Wikipedia 2023b]). Figure 5 depicts a variant of a one-dimensional random walk of a particle with position x – a well-studied model in physics. Analyzing the program’s termination behavior is hard because the probability q of moving to the left or right changes in every loop iteration depending on the previous position x . McIver et al. [2018] propose a proof rule based on *quasi-variants* that allows proving that *this program terminates almost-surely*, i.e. with probability one. Fair random walks, i.e. if $q = 1/2$, are well-known to terminate almost-surely but still have infinite expected runtime.

Example 1.5 (Lower Bounds on Expected Values [Hark et al. 2019]). Figure 6 shows another loop whose control flow depends on the outcome of coin flips. Hark et al. [2019] studied this example to demonstrate that induction-based proof rules for *lower bounds*¹, which are sound for classical verification, may become unsound when reasoning about probabilistic programs. The authors used martingale analysis and the optional stopping theorem to develop a sound proof rule capable of proving that, whenever $x \neq 0$ initially holds, then the expected value of y after the program’s termination is *at least* $1 + y$.

Challenges. We summarize the challenges of developing an infrastructure for automated verification of probabilistic programs unveiled by the examples in Figures 2 to 6:

First, there are many different verification techniques for probabilistic programs that are based on different concepts, e.g. quantitative invariants, quasi-variants, different notions of martingales, or stopping times of stochastic processes. Developing a language that is sufficiently expressive to encode these techniques while keeping it amenable to automation is a major challenge.

Second, verification of probabilistic programs involves *reasoning about both lower- and upper bounds* on expected values. This is different from classical program verification, which can be understood as proving that a given precondition implies a program’s weakest precondition, i.e. $\text{pre} \Rightarrow \text{wp}[[C]](\text{post})$. In other words, pre is a *lower bound* (in the Boolean lattice) on $\text{wp}[[C]](\text{post})$. Proving *upper bounds*, i.e. $\text{wp}[[C]](\text{post}) \Rightarrow \text{pre}$, has received scarce attention.²

Third, in Figures 3 to 5, we noticed that verification of probabilistic programs often involves reasoning about *unbounded* random variables and non-linear arithmetic involving exponentials, harmonic numbers, limits, and possibly infinite sums.

Our approach. We address the first challenge by developing a quantitative IVL and a real-valued logic tailored to verification of probabilistic programs. The IVL features quantitative generalizations of standard verification constructs such as assume- and assert-statements. Our quantitative constructs are inspired by Gödel logics [Baaz 1996; Preining 2010]. In particular, they have *dual co-constructs* for verifying upper- instead of lower bounds, thereby addressing the second challenge. These dual constructs are not only interesting for quantitative reasoning, but indeed also for Boolean reasoning à la $\text{wp}[[C]](\text{post}) \Rightarrow \text{pre}$. To address the third challenge, we rely on modern SMT solvers’ abilities to deal with custom theories, standard techniques for limiting the number of user-defined function applications, and custom optimizations.

Figure 7 shows a program written in our quantitative IVL; it encodes the verification of Example 1.3. We use a *coprocedure* to prove that the *quantitative precondition* $\text{exp}(0.5, \text{len}(l)) = 0.5^{\text{len}(l)}$ is an *upper bound* on the procedure’s termination probability³ given by the *quantitative postcondition* 1. We establish the above bound for the procedure body while assuming that it holds for recursive calls (cf. [Olmedo et al. 2016]). Our dual quantitative assert- and assume-statements encode the call in the usual way: we assert the procedure’s *pre* and assume its *post*.

¹Specifically: *lower bound on partial correctness plus proof of termination gives lower bound on total correctness.*

²Notable exceptions are Cousot’s necessary preconditions [Cousot et al. 2013] and recent works on (partial) incorrectness logic [O’Hearn 2020; Zhang and Kaminski 2022].

³Technically, $\text{exp}(0.5, \text{len}(l))$ upper-bounds the expected value of the random variable 1 after the procedure’s termination.

```

coproc lossy (l: List) -> ()
  pre exp(0.5, len(l))
  post 1
{
  if (len(l) > 0) {
    var coin:  $\mathbb{B}$   $\approx$  flip(0.5) // coin flip
    if (coin) {
      coassert exp(0.5, len(tail(l))); covalidate; coassume 1 // call of lossy(tail(l))
    } else {assert ?(false) } // diverge
  }
}

```

Fig. 7. Encoding of the lossy list traversal (see Figure 4) in our intermediate language.

Contributions. The main contributions of our work are:

- (1) A novel intermediate verification language ($\rightarrow$ Section 3) for automating probabilistic program verification techniques featuring *quantitative generalizations of standard verification constructs*, e.g. *assert* and *assume*, and a *formalization* of its semantics based on a real-valued logic ($\rightarrow$ Section 2) with constructs inspired by Gödel logics.
- (2) *Encodings of verification techniques and proof rules* with different theoretical underpinnings (e.g. domain theory, martingales, and the optional stopping theorem) taken from the probabilistic program verification literature into our intermediate language ($\rightarrow$ Section 4).
- (3) An SMT-backed *verification infrastructure* that enables researchers to prototype and automate verification techniques for probabilistic programs by encoding to our intermediate language, an *experimental evaluation* of its feasibility, and a prototypical *frontend* for verifying programs written in the probabilistic guarded command language ($\rightarrow$ Section 5).

Proofs and further details about our encodings are available online in a technical report.

2 HEYLO: A QUANTITATIVE ASSERTION LANGUAGE

When analyzing quantitative program properties such as runtimes, failure probabilities, or space usage, it is often more direct, more intuitive, and more practical to reason directly about *values* like the runtime n^2 , the probability $1/2^x$, or a list's length, instead of *predicates* like $rt = n^2$, $prob \leq 1/2^x$, or $\text{length}(ls) > 0$ (cf., [Kaminski et al. 2018; Ngo et al. 2018]).

This section introduces HeyLo – a real-valued logic for quantitative verification of probabilistic programs, which aims to take the role that predicate logic has for classical verification. By syntactifying real-valued functions, HeyLo serves as (1) a language for specifying quantitative properties – in particular those that McIver and Morgan [2005] (and many other authors) call *expectations*⁴ –, and (2) a foundation for automation by reducing many verification problems to a decision problem for HeyLo, e.g. validity or entailment checking. To ensure that HeyLo is expressive enough for (1), we design it reminiscently of the language by Batz et al. [2021b], which is relatively complete for the verification of probabilistic programs.

To ensure that HeyLo is suitable for (2), HeyLo is *first-order*, so as to simplify automation. Moreover, verification problems can often be stated as inequalities between to functions. To ensure

⁴For historical reasons, the term *expectations* refers to random variables on a program's state space.

that such inequalities can, in principle, be encoded into a *single* decision problem for HeyLo, we introduce *quantitative (co)implications* – which provide a syntax for comparing HeyLo formulae – and prove an analogue to the classical deduction theorem for predicate logic [Kleene 1952]. Supporting comparisons between expectations via (co)implications is essential for encoding proof rules for probabilistic programs. The (co)implications are inspired by intuitionistic Gödel logics [Baaz 1996; Preining 2010] and form Heyting algebras (cf. Theorem 2.1), hence the name HeyLo.

2.1 Program States and Expectations

Let $\text{Vars} = \{x, y, \dots\}$ be a countably infinite set of typed variables. We write $x : \tau$ to indicate that x is of type τ , i.e. τ is the set of values x can take. We assume the built-in types $\mathbb{B} = \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$, $\mathbb{N}$, $\mathbb{Z}$, $\mathbb{Q}$, $\mathbb{Q}_{\geq 0}$, $\mathbb{R}$, $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$, and $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^{\infty} = \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \cup \{\infty\}$; our verification infrastructure also supports user-defined mathematical types (cf. Section 5.1). We collect all types in Types and all values in $\text{Vals} = \bigcup_{\tau \in \text{Types}} \tau$. A (program) state σ maps every variable $x : \tau$ to a value in τ . The set of states is thus

$$\text{States} = \{ \sigma : \text{Vars} \rightarrow \text{Vals} \mid \text{for all } x \in \text{Vars}: x : \tau \text{ implies } \sigma(x) \in \tau \}.$$

Expectations are the quantitative analogue to logical predicates: they map program states to $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^{\infty}$ instead of truth values. The complete lattice $(\mathbb{E}, \leq)$ of expectations is given by

$$\mathbb{E} = \{ X \mid X : \text{States} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^{\infty} \} \quad \text{with} \quad X \leq Y \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{for all } \sigma \in \text{States}: X(\sigma) \leq Y(\sigma).$$

2.2 Syntax of HeyLo

We start with the construction of HeyLo's atoms. The set $\mathcal{T}$ of *terms* is given by the grammar

$$t ::= c \mid x \mid f(t, \dots, t),$$

where c is a *constant* in $\mathbb{Q} \cup \mathbb{B}$, x is a *variable* in Vars , and f is either one of the *built-in function* symbols $+$, $\cdot$, $-$, $<$, $=$, $\wedge$, $\vee$, $\neg$ ($\dot{-}$ is subtraction truncated at 0) or a typed *user-defined function* symbol $f : \tau_1 \times \dots \times \tau_n \rightarrow \tau$ for some $n \geq 0$ and types $\tau_1, \dots, \tau_n, \tau$ (cf. Section 5.1). Function symbols include, for example, the length of lists $\text{len} : \text{Lists} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ and the exponential function $\text{exp} : \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ mapping (r, n) to r^n .

We write $t : \tau$ to indicate that term t is of type τ . Typing and subtyping of terms is standard. In particular, if $t : \tau_1$ and $\tau_1 \subseteq \tau_2$, then $t : \tau_2$. We only consider well-typed terms.

We denote terms of type $\mathbb{Q}_{\geq 0}$ (resp. $\mathbb{B}$) by a (resp. b) and call them *arithmetic expressions* (resp. *Boolean expressions*). The set of HeyLo *formulae* is given by the following grammar:

$\varphi ::= a$	(arithmetic expressions)		$?(b)$	(Boolean embedding)
$\mid \varphi + \varphi$	(addition)		$\mid \varphi \cdot \varphi$	(multiplication)
$\mid \varphi \sqcap \varphi$	(minimum)		$\mid \varphi \sqcup \varphi$	(maximum)
$\mid \mathcal{L}x : \tau. \varphi$	(infimum over $x : \tau$)		$\mid \mathcal{Z}x : \tau. \varphi$	(supremum over $x : \tau$)
$\mid \varphi \rightarrow \varphi$	(implication)		$\mid \varphi \Leftarrow \varphi$	(coimplication)

We explain the meaning of HeyLo formulae in the next subsection. Free- and bound (by $\mathcal{Z}$ or $\mathcal{L}$ quantifiers) variables of a HeyLo formula φ are defined as usual. The order of precedence for arithmetic- and Boolean expressions is standard. For HeyLo formulae, the order of precedence is,

$$\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{Z} < \rightarrow, \Leftarrow < \sqcup < \sqcap < + < \cdot,$$

i.e. $\mathcal{L}$ and $\mathcal{Z}$ are least binding and $\cdot$ is most binding. We use parentheses to resolve ambiguities.

ρ	$\llbracket \rho \rrbracket(\sigma)$	ρ	$\llbracket \rho \rrbracket(\sigma)$
a	$\llbracket a \rrbracket(\sigma)$	$?(b)$	$\begin{cases} \infty, & \text{if } \llbracket b \rrbracket(\sigma) = \text{true} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$
$\varphi + \psi$	$\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma) + \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma)$	$\varphi \cdot \psi$	$\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma) \cdot \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma)$
$\varphi \sqcap \psi$	$\min \{ \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma), \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma) \}$	$\varphi \sqcup \psi$	$\max \{ \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma), \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma) \}$
$\mathcal{L}x: \tau. \varphi$	$\inf \{ \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma[x \mapsto v]) \mid v \in \tau \}$	$\mathcal{E}x: \tau. \varphi$	$\sup \{ \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma[x \mapsto v]) \mid v \in \tau \}$
$\varphi \rightarrow \psi$	$\begin{cases} \infty, & \text{if } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma) \leq \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma) \\ \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$	$\varphi \leftarrow \psi$	$\begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma) \geq \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma) \\ \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Fig. 8. Semantics of HeyLo. $\inf$ and $\sup$ are taken over $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^{\infty}$. Here $\sigma[x \mapsto v](y) = \begin{cases} v, & \text{if } x = y \\ \sigma(y), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$.

2.3 Semantics and Properties of HeyLo

A term $t: \tau$ evaluates to value $\llbracket t \rrbracket(\sigma) \in \tau$ on state σ . We assume the standard semantics for constants and built-in functions and that $\llbracket f \rrbracket$ is given for all user-defined functions.

The *semantics* of a HeyLo formula φ is an expectation $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket: \text{States} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^{\infty}$ defined by induction on the structure of φ in Figure 8, where we define $0 \cdot \infty = \infty \cdot 0 = 0$ as is common in measure theory. Two HeyLo formulae φ and ψ are *equivalent*, denoted $\varphi \equiv \psi$, iff $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket = \llbracket \psi \rrbracket$. A HeyLo formula

$$\varphi \text{ is valid} \quad \text{iff} \quad \varphi \equiv \infty \quad \text{and} \quad \varphi \text{ is covalid} \quad \text{iff} \quad \varphi \equiv 0.$$

For $\varphi, \psi \in \text{HeyLo}$, we define

$$\underbrace{\varphi \sqsubseteq \psi}_{\text{read: } \varphi \text{ lower-bounds } \psi} \quad \text{iff} \quad \underbrace{\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \leq \llbracket \psi \rrbracket}_{\text{pointwise inequality}} \quad \text{and} \quad \underbrace{\varphi \sqsupseteq \psi}_{\text{read: } \varphi \text{ upper-bounds } \psi} \quad \text{iff} \quad \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \geq \llbracket \psi \rrbracket.$$



These notions are central since we will encode verification problems as inequalities between HeyLo formulae. In contrast to classical IVLs, HeyLo contains constructs for *both* reasoning about lower-bounds and for reasoning about upper bounds. We briefly go over each construct in Figure 8.

Arithmetic- and Boolean Expressions. These expressions form the atoms of HeyLo. Consider, e.g. the arithmetic expressions $x + 1$ for some numeric variable x and $2 \cdot \text{len}(y)$ for a variable y : Lists. On state σ , $x + 1$ evaluates to $\sigma(x) + 1$, and $2 \cdot \text{len}(y)$ evaluates to 2 times the length of list $\sigma(y)$.

Boolean expressions b are embedded in HeyLo using the *embedding operator* $?(\cdot)$: On state σ , $?(b)$ evaluates to ∞ (think: true, since ∞ is the top element in the lattice of expectations) if σ satisfies b , and to 0 otherwise. For instance, $?(x + 1 = 2 \cdot \text{len}(y))$ evaluates to ∞ if $\sigma(x) + 1$ is equal to two times the length of the list $\sigma(y)$, and to 0 otherwise.

Addition, Multiplication, Minimum, and Maximum. HeyLo formulae can be composed by standard binary arithmetic operations for sums (+), products ($\cdot$), minimum ($\sqcap$), and maximum ($\sqcup$). Each of these operations are understood pointwise (with the assumption that $\infty \cdot 0 = 0$). For instance, $\llbracket \text{len}(y_1) \sqcap \text{len}(y_2) \rrbracket(\sigma)$ is the minimum length of lists $\sigma(y_1)$ and $\sigma(y_2)$.

Quantifiers. The *infimum quantifier* $\mathcal{L}$ and the *supremum quantifier* $\mathcal{E}$ from [Batz et al. 2021b] are the quantitative analogues of the universal $\forall$ and the existential $\exists$ quantifier from predicate logic. Intuitively, the $\mathcal{L}$ quantifier minimizes a quantity, just like the $\forall$ quantifier minimizes a predicate's truth value. Dually, the $\mathcal{E}$ quantifier maximizes a quantity just like $\exists$ maximizes a predicate's truth

Fig. 9. $\llbracket 5 \rightarrow x \rrbracket(\sigma)$ for $\sigma(x) \in [0, 10]$.Fig. 10. $\llbracket 5 \Leftarrow x \rrbracket(\sigma)$ for $\sigma(x) \in [0, 10]$.

value. The quantitative quantifiers embed $\forall$ and $\exists$ in HeyLo, i.e. for $b: \mathbb{B}$ and $\sigma \in \text{States}$,

$$\llbracket \mathcal{L}x: \tau. ?(b) \rrbracket(\sigma) = \begin{cases} \infty, & \text{if } \sigma \models \forall x: \tau. b \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad \llbracket \mathcal{Z}x: \tau. ?(b) \rrbracket(\sigma) = \begin{cases} \infty, & \text{if } \sigma \models \exists x: \tau. b \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Here, $\models$ denotes the standard satisfaction relation of first-order logic. The above construction extends canonically to nested quantifiers, e.g. $\exists x: \tau. \forall y: \tau'. b$ corresponds to $\mathcal{Z}x: \tau. \mathcal{L}y: \tau'. ?(b)$.

For a quantitative example, consider the formula $\varphi = \mathcal{Z}x: \mathbb{Q}_{\geq 0}. ?(x \cdot x < 2) \sqcap x$. On state σ , the subformula $?(x \cdot x < 2) \sqcap x$ evaluates to $\sigma(x)$ if $\sigma(x) \cdot \sigma(x) < 2$, and to 0 otherwise. Consequently,

$$\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma) = \sup \{ r \in \mathbb{Q}_{\geq 0} \mid r \cdot r < 2 \} = \sqrt{2}.$$

Notice that $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma)$ is *irrational* even though all constituents of φ are rational-valued. It has been shown in [Batz et al. 2021b] that – similar to our above construction of $\sqrt{2}$ – the quantitative quantifiers combined with arithmetic- and (embedded) Boolean expressions over $\mathbb{Q}_{\geq 0}$ enable the construction of *all* expected values emerging from discrete probabilistic programs.

(Co)implication. $\rightarrow$ and $\Leftarrow$ generalize Boolean implication and converse nonimplication.⁵ For state σ , the *implication* $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ evaluates to ∞ if $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma) \leq \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma)$, and to $\llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma)$ otherwise. Dually, the *coimplication* $\varphi \Leftarrow \psi$ evaluates to 0 if $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma) \geq \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma)$, and to $\llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma)$ otherwise.

To gain some intuition, we first note that the top element ∞ of our quantitative domain $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^{\infty}$ can be viewed as “entirely true” (i.e. as true as it can possibly get) and 0 can be viewed as “entirely false” (i.e. as false as it can possibly get). The implication $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ makes ψ *more true* by lowering the threshold above which ψ is considered entirely true – and thus ∞ – to φ . In other words: Anything that is at least as true as φ is considered entirely true. Anything less true than φ remains as true as ψ . Figure 9 illustrates this for the formula $5 \rightarrow x$.

As another example, $x^2 \rightarrow x$ evaluates to ∞ for states σ with $\sigma(x) \in [0, 1]$; otherwise, x is below the threshold x^2 at which x is considered entirely true and thus the implication evaluates to x .

The intuition underlying the coimplication is dual: $\varphi \Leftarrow \psi$ makes ψ *less true* by raising the threshold below which ψ is considered entirely false – and thus 0 – to φ . In other words: Anything that is not more true than φ is considered entirely false. Anything that is more true than φ remains as true as ψ . Figure 10 illustrates this for the formula $5 \Leftarrow x$.

Chained implications can also be understood in terms of lowering thresholds: $\varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \rho)$ lowers the threshold at which ρ is considered entirely true to φ and ψ , whichever is lower. Formally, $\varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \rho)$ is equivalent to $(\varphi \sqcap \psi) \rightarrow \rho$. More generally, (co)implications are the adjoints of the minimum $\sqcap$ and maximum $\sqcup$:

⁵The converse nonimplication of propositions P and Q is defined as $\neg(P \Leftarrow Q)$ and is to be read as “ Q does not imply P ”.

THEOREM 2.1 (ADJOINTNESS PROPERTIES). *For all HeyLo formulae φ , ψ , and ρ , we have*

$$\varphi \sqcap \psi \sqsubseteq \rho \quad \text{iff} \quad \varphi \sqsubseteq \psi \rightarrow \rho \quad \text{and} \quad \psi \sqcup \rho \sqsupseteq \varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad \rho \sqsupseteq \psi \Leftarrow \varphi.$$

Both $\rightarrow$ and $\Leftarrow$ are backward compatible to Boolean implication and converse nonimplication:

$$\llbracket ?(b_1) \rightarrow ?(b_2) \rrbracket(\sigma) = \begin{cases} \infty, & \text{if } \sigma \models b_1 \rightarrow b_2 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \llbracket ?(b_1) \Leftarrow ?(b_2) \rrbracket(\sigma) = \begin{cases} \infty, & \text{if } \sigma \models \neg(b_1 \leftarrow b_2) \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

We will primarily use (co)implications to (1) incorporate the capability of *comparing* expectations syntactically in HeyLo and to (2) express *assumptions*. Application (1) is justified by the following quantitative version of the well-known deduction theorem⁶ from first-order logic [Kleene 1952]:

THEOREM 2.2 (HeyLo DEDUCTION THEOREM). *For all HeyLo formulae φ and ψ , we have*

$$\varphi \sqsubseteq \psi \quad \text{iff} \quad \varphi \rightarrow \psi \text{ is valid} \quad \text{and} \quad \varphi \sqsupseteq \psi \quad \text{iff} \quad \varphi \Leftarrow \psi \text{ is covalid}.$$

For application (2), consider the implication $?(b) \rightarrow \psi$; it evaluates to ψ whenever b holds, and to ∞ otherwise. As in predicate logic, the implication can be read as *assuming b holds before evaluating ψ* . Formally,

$$\llbracket ?(b) \rightarrow \psi \rrbracket(\sigma) = \begin{cases} \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma), & \text{if } \sigma \models b \\ \infty, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

Now, consider the inequality $\varphi \sqsubseteq ?(b) \rightarrow \psi$. For all states σ *not* satisfying b (i.e. the set of states that we do *not* assume), the inequality vacuously holds. For all other states (i.e. those states that we actually assume), φ must lower-bound ψ in order for the inequality to hold.

Example 2.3. Let $\varphi, \psi \in \text{HeyLo}$ and $b : \mathbb{B}$. We construct a HeyLo formula ρ that, on state σ , evaluates to φ if $\sigma \models b$, and to ψ otherwise. For that, we use the Boolean embedding and the implication:

$$\rho = \underbrace{?(b) \rightarrow \varphi}_{\text{if } b \text{ holds, evaluate to } \varphi} \sqcap \underbrace{?(\neg b) \rightarrow \psi}_{\text{if } \neg b \text{ holds, evaluate to } \psi}$$

To encode assumptions using the coimplication $\Leftarrow$, we first introduce Boolean *co*-embeddings

$$\llbracket \text{co}?(b) \rrbracket = \llbracket ?(\neg b) \rrbracket = \lambda\sigma. \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \llbracket b \rrbracket(\sigma) = \text{true} \\ \infty, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

We then obtain a dual construction using $\Leftarrow$ for encoding assumptions: By [Theorem 2.1](#), we have

$$\varphi \sqsupseteq \text{co}?(b) \Leftarrow \psi \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{for all } \sigma \in \text{States}: \llbracket b \rrbracket(\sigma) = \text{true} \text{ implies } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma) \geq \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma),$$

i.e. the coimplication $\text{co}?(b) \Leftarrow \psi$ ensures that it suffices to reason about states satisfying b .

2.4 Qualitative Reasoning in HeyLo

The verification of probabilistic programs comprises both quantitative *and* qualitative reasoning. Whereas questions like “what is the expected value of program variable x upon termination” are inherently quantitative, questions like “does x increase in expectation after one loop iteration?” are qualitative. HeyLo marries quantitative and qualitative reasoning. To shift to a qualitative statement, we first consider the *negation* $\neg\varphi$ and *conegation* $\sim\varphi$ of φ obtained from our (co)implications:

$$\llbracket \neg\varphi \rrbracket = \llbracket \varphi \rightarrow 0 \rrbracket = \lambda\sigma. \begin{cases} \infty, & \text{if } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma) = 0 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \llbracket \sim\varphi \rrbracket = \llbracket \varphi \Leftarrow \infty \rrbracket = \lambda\sigma. \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma) = \infty \\ \infty, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

⁶We mean the deduction theorem that relates semantical entailment $\models$ with the material conditional $\rightarrow$. Another theorem also known as *deduction theorem* relates syntactical entailment (i.e. provability) $\vdash$ with the material conditional $\rightarrow$.

The (co)negation always evaluates to either ∞ , the top element of $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^{\infty}$ (entirely true), or 0, the bottom element of $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^{\infty}$ (entirely false). By applying a (co)negation twice, we turn an arbitrary expectation into a qualitative statement. Formally, we define the *(pointwise) validation* $\Delta(\varphi)$ and *(pointwise) covalidation* $\nabla(\varphi)$ by⁷

$$\llbracket \Delta(\varphi) \rrbracket = \llbracket \sim \sim \varphi \rrbracket = \lambda \sigma. \begin{cases} \infty, & \text{if } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma) = \infty \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad \llbracket \nabla(\varphi) \rrbracket = \llbracket \neg \neg \varphi \rrbracket = \lambda \sigma. \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma) = 0 \\ \infty, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

In words, the validation $\Delta(\varphi)$ is (pointwise) entirely true whenever φ is entirely true, and entirely false otherwise. Dually, $\nabla(\varphi)$ is entirely false whenever φ is entirely false, and entirely true otherwise. Thus, both validations and covalidations “boolify” HeyLo formulae. The difference is that validations pull intermediate truth values down to entire falsehood whereas covalidations lift intermediate truth values up to entire truth.

Turning expectations into qualitative statements has an important application, which often arises when encoding verification problems: Suppose we are given two formulae φ, ψ with free variables $y_1, \dots, y_n$. Moreover, our goal is to construct a HeyLo formula ρ that evaluates to x of type $\mathbb{Q}_{\geq 0}$ if $\varphi \sqsubseteq \psi$, and to 0 otherwise. For that, we first construct the formula $\mathcal{L} y_1, \dots, y_n. \Delta(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$. Due to the infimum quantifier over all free variables, this formula is *equivalent* to ∞ if $\varphi \sqsubseteq \psi$, and *equivalent* to 0 otherwise. Hence, we construct ρ as

$$\underbrace{(\mathcal{L} y_1 : \tau_1, \dots, y_n : \tau_n. \Delta(\varphi \rightarrow \psi))}_{\text{evaluate to 0 if } \varphi \not\sqsubseteq \psi} \quad \underbrace{\sqcap}_{\text{and}} \quad \underbrace{x}_{\text{evaluate to } x \text{ otherwise}}.$$

Moreover, we obtain a dual construction using $\Leftarrow$ and the supremum quantifier:

$$\underbrace{(\mathcal{E} y_1 : \tau_1, \dots, y_n : \tau_n. \nabla(\varphi \Leftarrow \psi))}_{\text{evaluate to } \infty \text{ if } \varphi \not\sqsupseteq \psi} \quad \underbrace{\sqcup}_{\text{and}} \quad \underbrace{x}_{\text{evaluate to } x \text{ otherwise}}.$$

3 HeyVL: A QUANTITATIVE INTERMEDIATE VERIFICATION LANGUAGE

Many verification problems for probabilistic programs reduce naturally to checking inequalities between HeyLo formulae.⁸ Consider, for instance, the program

$$y \approx \frac{1}{2} \cdot \langle x \rangle + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \langle x + 1 \rangle,$$

which sets y either to x or to $x + 1$, depending on the outcome of a fair coin flip. Suppose we want to verify that $x + \frac{1}{2}$ is a *lower* bound on the expected value of y after executing above program. According to [McIver and Morgan \[2005\]](#), verifying this bound amounts to proving the inequality

$$\underbrace{x + \frac{1}{2}}_{\text{proposed lower bound}} \sqsubseteq \frac{1}{2} \cdot x + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (x + 1) \triangleq \underbrace{\text{wp}[y \approx \frac{1}{2} \cdot \langle x \rangle + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \langle x + 1 \rangle](y)}_{\text{expected outcome of } x + \text{fair coin flip stored in } y}, \quad (\text{ex})$$

where the weakest preexpectation $\text{wp}[C](f)$ is a function (which we can represent as a HeyLo formula) that maps every initial state σ to the expected value of f after executing the program C on input σ . Our goal is to simplify writing, composing, and reasoning *modularly* about such expected values and similar quantities. To this end, we propose HeyVL, a novel intermediate verification language for modeling quantitative verification problems.

HeyVL *programs* are organized as a *collection of procedures*. Each procedure P is equipped with a body S and a specification. The body S is a HeyVL *statement* and can for now be thought of

⁷In Gödel logics, these are also called *projection modalities* [\[Baaz 1996\]](#).

⁸Or equivalently by [Theorem 2.2](#): Checking (co)validity, i.e. whether a HeyLo formula is equivalent to ∞ (resp. 0).

```

proc ex (x: UInt) -> (y: UInt) // procedure that takes x as input and returns the value of y
  pre  $x + \frac{1}{2}$  // lower bound on the expected value of y after termination of the body
  post y // quantity of interest evaluated in final states
{
   $y \approx \frac{1}{2} \cdot \langle x \rangle + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \langle x + 1 \rangle$  // returns the sum of x plus outcome of a fair coin flip
}

```

Fig. 11. A HeyVL procedure whose verification condition is equation (ex).

as a more or less ordinary probabilistic program.⁹ The specification of a procedure comprises a *pre* φ and a *post* ψ , both HeyLo formulae. Intuitively, a procedure P *verifies* if its body S adheres to P 's specification, meaning essentially that the inequality $\varphi \sqsubseteq \text{wp}[\![S]\!](\psi)$ holds, i.e. the expected value of ψ after executing S is lower-bounded by φ . This inequality will be called the *verification condition* of P . An entire HeyVL program *verifies* if all of its procedures verify.

How do we describe the verification problem (ex) in HeyVL? As shown in Figure 11, we write a single procedure P with body $y \approx \frac{1}{2} \cdot \langle x \rangle + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \langle x + 1 \rangle$, pre $x + \frac{1}{2}$, and post y . This gives rise to the verification condition $x + \frac{1}{2} \sqsubseteq \text{wp}[\![y \approx \frac{1}{2} \cdot \langle x \rangle + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \langle x + 1 \rangle]\!](y)$, which is precisely the inequality (ex) we aim to verify. The HeyLo program (i.e. the single procedure P) verifies if and only if we have positively answered the verification problem (ex).

To encode more complex verification problems or proof rules, one may need to write more than one HeyVL procedure. For example, in Section 4.1, we will encode a proof rule for conditional expected values that requires establishing a lower *and* a different upper bound. The latter can be described using a second HeyVL procedure, see Section 3.1. Furthermore, it is natural to break down large programs and/or complex proof rules into smaller (possibly mutually recursive) procedures, which can be verified modularly based on the truth of their verification conditions.

3.1 HeyVL Procedures

A HeyVL procedure consists of a name, a list of (typed) input and output variables, a body, and a quantitative specification. Syntactically, a HeyVL procedure is of the form

```

proc P ( $\overline{in} : \tau$ ) -> ( $\overline{out} : \tau$ ) // procedure name P with read-only inputs  $\overline{in}$  and outputs  $\overline{out}$ 
  pre  $\varphi$  // pre: HeyLo formula over inputs
  post  $\psi$  // post: HeyLo formula over inputs or outputs
{ S } // procedure body

```

where P is the procedure's name, $\overline{in}$ and $\overline{out}$ are (possibly empty and pairwise distinct) lists of typed program variables called the *inputs* and *outputs* of P . The specification is given by a *pre* φ which is a HeyLo formula over variables in $\overline{in}$ and a *post* ψ which is also a HeyLo formula but ranging over variables in $\overline{in}$ or $\overline{out}$. The *procedure body* S is a HeyVL statement, whose syntax and semantics will be formalized in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.

As mentioned above, the procedure P gives rise to a verification condition, namely $\varphi \sqsubseteq \text{wp}[\![S]\!](\psi)$. However, this is only accurate if S is an ordinary probabilistic program. As our statements S may also contain non-executable¹⁰ verification-specific assume and assert commands, the *verification*

⁹There are verification-specific statements which can be part of the procedure body which we will describe later.

¹⁰But expected value changing.

```

proc n_dice (n: UInt) -> (r: UReal)
  pre  $3.5 \cdot n$ 
  post r
  { S }

```

Fig. 12. Expected sum of rolling n fair dice.

```

proc rabin (i: UInt) -> (ok: Bool)
  pre  $\frac{2}{3} \sqcap ?(1 < i)$ 
  post  $1 \sqcap ?(ok)$ 
  { S }

```

Fig. 13. Rabin's mutual exclusion property.

condition generated by P is actually

$$\varphi \sqsubseteq \text{vp}[\![S]\!](\psi),$$

where vp is the *verification preexpectation transformer* that extends the aforementioned weakest preexpectation wp by semantics for the verification-specific statements, see [Section 3.3](#). For procedure calls, we approximate the weakest preexpectation based on the callee's specification to enable modular verification, see [Section 3.5](#).

Readers familiar with classical Boolean deductive verification may think of the verification condition $\varphi \sqsubseteq \text{vp}[\![S]\!](\psi)$ as a *quantitative Hoare triple* $\langle \varphi \rangle S \langle \psi \rangle$, where $\sqsubseteq$ takes the quantitative role of the Boolean $\implies$, i.e. we have

$$\langle \varphi \rangle S \langle \psi \rangle \text{ is valid} \quad \text{iff} \quad \varphi \sqsubseteq \text{vp}[\![S]\!](\psi).$$

Indeed, if φ and ψ are ordinary Boolean predicates and S is a non-recursive non-probabilistic program, then $\langle \varphi \rangle S \langle \psi \rangle$ is a standard Hoare triple: whenever state σ satisfies precondition φ , then procedure body S must successfully terminate on σ in a state satisfying postcondition ψ .

Phrased differently: for every initial state σ , the truth value $\varphi(\sigma)$ lower-bounds the *anticipated* truth value (evaluated in σ) of postcondition ψ after termination of S on σ . For arbitrary HeyLo formulae φ, ψ and probabilistic procedure bodies S , the second view generalizes to quantitative reasoning à la [McIver and Morgan \[2005\]](#): The quantitative triple $\langle \varphi \rangle S \langle \psi \rangle$ is valid iff the pre φ lower-bounds the *expected value* (evaluated in initial states) of the post ψ after termination of S . In [Section 3.5](#), we will describe how *calling* a (verified) procedure P can be thought of as “invoking” the validity of the quantitative Hoare triple that is given by P 's specification.

Notice that the above inequality is our definition of validity of a quantitative Hoare triple and we do not provide an operational definition of validity. This is due to a lack of an intuitive operational semantics for quantitative assume and assert statements (cf. also [Section 7](#)).

Examples. Besides [Figure 11](#), [Figures 12](#) and [13](#) further illustrate how HeyVL procedures specify quantitative program properties; we omit concrete procedure bodies S to focus on the specification. The procedure in [Figure 12](#) specifies that the expected value of output r must be at least $3.5 \cdot n$ – a property satisfied by any statement S that rolls n fair dice. The procedure in [Figure 13](#) specifies that the expected value of output ok being true after termination of S , i.e. the probability that the returned value ok will be true, is at least $\frac{2}{3}$ whenever input i is greater than one – a key property of Rabin's randomized mutual exclusion algorithm [[Kushilevitz and Rabin 1992](#)] from [Figure 2](#) and discussed in the introduction. Since we aim to reason about probabilities, we ensure that the post is one-bounded by considering $1 \sqcap ?(ok)$ instead of $?(ok)$.

Coprocedures – Duals to Procedures. Proving *upper* bounds is often relevant for quantitative verification, e.g. when analyzing expected runtimes of randomized algorithms (cf. [[Kaminski et al. 2018](#)]). HeyVL also supports coprocedures which give rise to the dual verification condition

$\varphi \sqsupseteq \text{vp}[\![S]\!](\psi)$.¹¹ The syntax of coprocedures is analogous to HeyVL procedures; the only difference is the keyword `coproc` instead of `proc`. For example, a coprocedure which was defined as in Figure 12 (except for replacing `proc` by `coproc`) would specify that the expected value of output r must be *at most* $3.5 \cdot n$. We demonstrate in Section 4 that intricate verification techniques for probabilistic programs may require lower *and* upper bound reasoning, i.e. HeyVL programs that are collections of both procedures and coprocedures.

HeyVL Programs. To summarize, a HeyVL *program* is a list of procedures and coprocedures that each give rise to a verification condition, i.e. a HeyLo inequality. We say that a HeyVL program *verifies* iff all verification conditions of its (co)procedures hold.

Design Decisions. Since HeyVL is an intermediate language, we favor simplicity over convenience. In particular, we require procedure inputs to be read-only, i.e. evaluate to the same values in initial and final states. Moreover, HeyVL has no loops and no global variables. All variables that can possibly be modified by a procedure call are given by its outputs. All of the above restrictions can be lifted by high-level languages that encode to HeyVL.

3.2 Syntax of HeyVL Statements

HeyVL statements, which appear in procedure bodies, provide a programming-language-style to express and approximate *expected values* arising in the verification of probabilistic programs, including expected outcomes of program variables, reachability probabilities such as the probability of termination, and expected rewards. HeyVL statements consist of (a) *standard constructs* such as assignments, sampling from discrete probability distributions, sequencing, and nondeterministic branching, and (b) *verification-specific constructs* for modeling rewards such as runtime, quantitative assertions and assumptions, and for forgetting values of program variables in the current state.

The syntax of HeyVL statements S is given by the grammar

$S ::= \text{var } x : \tau \approx \mu$	$ \text{if } (\sqcap) \{S\} \text{ else } \{S\}$	$ \text{if } (\sqcup) \{S\} \text{ else } \{S\}$
$ x_1, \dots, x_n := P(e_1, \dots, e_m)$	$ \text{assert } \psi$	$ \text{coassert } \psi$
$ \text{reward } a$	$ \text{assume } \psi$	$ \text{coassume } \psi$
$ S; S$	$ \text{havoc } x$	$ \text{cohavoc } x$
	$ \text{validate}$	$ \text{covalidate},$

where $x \in \text{Vars}$ is of type τ , a is an arithmetic expression, and ψ is a HeyLo formula. Moreover, μ is a *distribution expression* of type τ ¹²

$$\mu = p_1 \cdot \langle t_1 \rangle + \dots + p_n \cdot \langle t_n \rangle$$

with $n \geq 1$, where each p_i is a term of type $[0, 1]$, each t_i is a term of type τ , and $\sum_{i=1}^n \llbracket p_i \rrbracket(\sigma) = 1$ for every state σ . A distribution expression μ represents finite-support probability distributions, which assign probability p_i to each t_i . We often write $\text{flip}(p)$ instead of $p \cdot \langle \text{true} \rangle + (1-p) \cdot \langle \text{false} \rangle$.

We briefly go over the above constructs. `var  $x : \tau \approx \mu$` is a *probabilistic assignment* which assigns to variable x a value *sampled* from the probability distribution described by μ . The statement `$x_1, \dots, x_n := P(e_1, \dots, e_m)$` is a (co)procedure call. We can think of it as passing the parameters $e_1, \dots, e_m$ to (co)procedure P , executing P 's body, and assigning the return values to variables $x_1, \dots, x_n$. The statement `reward  $a$` collects/accumulates/adds a reward of a , modeling e.g. progression in (run)time or resource consumption. `$S_1; S_2$` puts HeyVL statements in sequence.

¹¹Notice $\sqsupseteq$ for coprocedures as opposed to $\sqsubseteq$ for procedures.

¹² μ can be instantiated with more general distribution expressions as long as the vp semantics (cf. Section 3.3) is computable.

S	$\text{vp}\llbracket S \rrbracket(\varphi)$	S	$\text{vp}\llbracket S \rrbracket(\varphi)$
$\text{var } x: \tau \approx \mu$	$p_1 \cdot \varphi[x \mapsto t_1] + \dots + p_n \cdot \varphi[x \mapsto t_n]$	$\text{reward } a$	$\varphi + a$
$\text{if } (\sqcap) \{S_1\} \text{ else } \{S_2\}$	$\text{vp}\llbracket S_1 \rrbracket(\varphi) \sqcap \text{vp}\llbracket S_2 \rrbracket(\varphi)$	$S_1; S_2$	$\text{vp}\llbracket S_1 \rrbracket(\text{vp}\llbracket S_2 \rrbracket(\varphi))$
$\text{assert } \psi$	$\psi \sqcap \varphi$	$\text{if } (\sqcup) \{S_1\} \text{ else } \{S_2\}$	$\text{vp}\llbracket S_1 \rrbracket(\varphi) \sqcup \text{vp}\llbracket S_2 \rrbracket(\varphi)$
$\text{assume } \psi$	$\psi \rightarrow \varphi$	$\text{coassert } \psi$	$\psi \sqcup \varphi$
$\text{havoc } x$	$\mathcal{L}x. \varphi$	$\text{coassume } \psi$	$\psi \leftarrow \varphi$
validate	$\Delta(\varphi)$	$\text{cohavoc } x$	$\mathcal{Z}x. \varphi$
		covalidate	$\nabla(\varphi)$

Fig. 14. Semantics of HeyVL statements. Here $\mu = p_1 \cdot \langle t_1 \rangle + \dots + p_n \cdot \langle t_n \rangle$ and $\varphi[x \mapsto t_i]$ is the formula obtained from substituting every occurrence of x in φ by t_i in a capture-avoiding manner. For procedure calls, see [Section 3.5](#).

$\text{if } (\cdot) \{S_1\} \text{ else } \{S_2\}$ is a *nondeterministic* choice between S_1 and S_2 , where $\cdot$ determines whether the nondeterminism is resolved in a minimizing ($\sqcap$) or maximizing ($\sqcup$) manner. $\text{assert } \psi$ and $\text{assume } \psi$ are quantitative generalizations of assertions and assumptions from classical IVLs. $\text{coassert } \psi$ and $\text{coassume } \psi$ are novel statements that enable reasoning about upper bounds; there is yet no analogue in classical verification infrastructures.

$\text{havoc } x$ and $\text{cohavoc } x$ forget the current value of x by branching nondeterministically over all possible values of x either in a minimizing ($\text{havoc } x$) or maximizing ($\text{cohavoc } x$) manner. Finally, validate and covalidate turn *quantitative* expectations into *qualitative* expressions, much in the flavor of validation and covalidation described earlier (see [Section 2.4](#)).

Declarations and Types. We assume that all local variables (those that are neither inputs nor outputs) are initialized by an assignment before they are used; those assignments also declare the variables' types. If we assign to an already initialized variable, we often write $x \approx \mu$ instead of $\text{var } x: \tau \approx \mu$. Moreover, if μ is a *Dirac* distribution, i.e. if $p_1 = 1$, we often write $x := t_1$ instead of $x \approx \mu$. Finally, we assume that all programs and associated HeyLo formulae are well-typed.

3.3 Semantics of HeyVL Statements

Inspired by weakest preexpectations [[Kaminski 2019](#); [McIver and Morgan 2005](#)], we give semantics to HeyVL statements as a backward-moving continuation-passing style HeyLo transformer

$$\text{vp}\llbracket S \rrbracket: \text{HeyLo} \rightarrow \text{HeyLo}$$

by induction on S in [Figure 14](#). (Co)procedure calls are treated separately in [Section 3.5](#). We call $\text{vp}\llbracket S \rrbracket(\varphi)$ the *verification preexpectation* of S with respect to post φ . Intuitively, $\llbracket \text{vp}\llbracket S \rrbracket(\varphi) \rrbracket(\sigma)$ is the expected value of φ w.r.t. the distribution of final states obtained from “executing”¹³ S on σ . The post φ is either given by the surrounding procedure declaration or can be thought of as the verification preexpectation described by the *remaining* HeyVL statement: for $S = S_1; S_2$, we first obtain the intermediate verification preexpectation $\text{vp}\llbracket S_2 \rrbracket(\varphi)$ — the expected value of what remains after executing S_1 — and pass this into $\text{vp}\llbracket S_1 \rrbracket$.

Random Assignments. The expected value of φ after executing $\text{var } x: \tau \approx \mu$ is the weighted sum $p_1 \cdot \varphi[x \mapsto t_1] + \dots + p_n \cdot \varphi[x \mapsto t_n]$, where each p_i is the probability that x is assigned t_i .

¹³Some verification-specific statements are not really *executable* but serve the purpose of manipulating expected values.

Rewards. Suppose that the post φ captures the expected reward collected in an execution that follows *after* executing reward a . Then the entire expected reward is given by $\varphi + a$.

Nondeterministic Choices. $\text{vp}[\text{if } (\cdot) \{S_1\} \text{ else } \{S_2\}](\varphi)$ is the pointwise minimum ($\cdot = \sqcap$) or maximum ($\cdot = \sqcup$) of the expected values obtained from S_1 and S_2 , respectively.

(Co)assertions. In *classical* intermediate verification languages, the statement `assert A` for some predicate A models a proof obligation: All states reaching `assert A` on some execution must satisfy A . In terms of classical weakest preconditions, `assert A` transforms a postcondition B to

$$\text{wp}[\text{assert } A](B) = A \wedge B.$$

In words, `assert A` *caps* the truth of postcondition B at A : all lower-bounds on the above weakest precondition (in terms of the Boolean lattice $(\text{States} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}, \Rightarrow)$) must not exceed A .

This perspective generalizes well to our quantitative assertions: Given a HeyLo formula ψ , the statement `assert  $\psi$` *caps* the post at ψ . Thus, analogously to classical assertions, all *lower* bounds on the verification preexpectation $\text{vp}[\text{assert } \psi](\varphi)$ (in terms of $\sqsubseteq$) must not exceed ψ .

Coassertions are dual to assertions: `coassert  $\psi$` *raises* the post φ to at least ψ . Hence, all *upper* bounds on $\text{vp}[\text{coassert } \psi](\varphi)$ must not *subceed* ψ .

(Co)assumptions. In the classical setting, the statement `assume A` for some predicate A *weakens* the verification condition: verification succeeds vacuously for all states not satisfying A . In terms of classical weakest preconditions, `assume A` transforms a postcondition B to

$$\text{wp}[\text{assume } A](B) = A \rightarrow B$$

i.e. `assume A` *lowers* the threshold at which the post B is considered true (the top element of the Boolean lattice) to A . Indeed, if we identify `true` = 1 and `false` = 0, then

$$\llbracket \text{wp}[\text{assume } A](B) \rrbracket(\sigma) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \llbracket A \rrbracket(\sigma) \leq \llbracket B \rrbracket(\sigma) \\ \llbracket B \rrbracket(\sigma), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The above perspective on classical assumptions generalizes to our quantitative assumptions. Given a HeyLo formula ψ , `assume  $\psi$` lowers the threshold above which the post φ is considered entirely true (i.e. ∞ – the top element of the lattice of expectations) to ψ . Formally,

$$\llbracket \text{vp}[\text{assume } \psi](\varphi) \rrbracket(\sigma) = \begin{cases} \infty, & \text{if } \llbracket \psi \rrbracket(\sigma) \leq \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma) \\ \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket(\sigma), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Reconsider [Figure 9](#) on [page 8](#), which illustrates $\text{vp}[\text{assume } 5](x)$: `assume 5` lowers the threshold at which the post x is considered entirely true to 5, i.e. whenever the post-expectation x evaluates at least to 5, then $\text{vp}[\text{assume } 5](x)$ evaluates to ∞ . Notice furthermore that our quantitative `assume` is backward compatible to the classical one in the sense that $\text{vp}[\text{assume } ?(b)](\varphi)$ evaluates to φ for every state satisfying b , and to ∞ otherwise.

Coassumptions are dual to assumptions. `coassume  $\psi$` raises the threshold at which the post φ is considered entirely false (i.e. 0 – the bottom element of the lattice of expectations) to ψ . Reconsider [Figure 10](#) on [page 8](#) illustrating $\text{vp}[\text{coassume } 5](x)$: `coassume 5` raises the threshold below which the post x is considered entirely false to 5, i.e. if the post x evaluates at most to 5, then $\text{vp}[\text{coassume } 5](x)$ evaluates to 0.

Example 3.1 (Modeling Conditionals). We did not include `if (b) {S1} else {S2}` for conditional branching in HeyVL’s grammar. We can encode it as follows (and will use it from now on):

$$\text{if } (\sqcap) \{ \text{assume } ?(b); S_1 \} \text{ else } \{ \text{assume } ?(\neg b); S_2 \}$$

```

proc  $P(x_1 : \tau_1, \dots, x_n : \tau_n) \rightarrow (y_1 : \tau'_1, \dots, y_m : \tau'_m)$ 
  pre  $\rho$ 
  post  $\psi$ 
  {  $S$  }

```

Fig. 15. A procedure P . We encode calls $z_1, \dots, z_n := P(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ for arbitrary probabilistic statements S .

The vp semantics of this statement is analogous to the formula described in [Example 2.3](#) and complies with our above description of assumptions: Depending on the satisfaction of b by the current state σ , the vp of S either evaluates to the vp of S_1 or S_2 , respectively.

(Co)havocs. In the classical setting, havoc x forgets the current value of x by universally quantifying over all possible initial values of x . In terms of classical weakest preconditions, we have

$$\text{wp}[\![\text{havoc } x]\!](B) = \forall x : \tau. B,$$

i.e. havoc x *minimizes* the post B under all possible values for x , thus requiring B to hold for all x . This perspective generalizes to our quantitative setting: In terms of vp, havoc x forgets the current value of x by minimizing the post-expectation under all possible values of x . Dually, cohavoc x forgets the value of x but this time *maximizes* the post-expectation under all possible values for x .

(Co)validations. These statements convert quantitative statements into qualitative ones by casting expectations into the $\{0, \infty\}$ -valued realm, thus eradicating intermediate truth values strictly between 0 and ∞ . Their classical analogues would be effectless, as the Boolean setting features no intermediate truth values. We briefly explained in [Section 2.4](#) how such a conversion to a qualitative statement works in HeyLo. An example will be discussed in [Section 4.2](#).

3.4 Properties of HeyVL Statements

We study two properties of HeyVL. First, our vp semantics is *monotonic* – a crucial property for encoding proof rules (cf. [Section 3.5](#)).

THEOREM 3.2 (MONOTONICITY OF vp). *For all HeyVL statements S and HeyLo formulae φ, φ' ,*

$$\varphi \sqsubseteq \varphi' \text{ implies } \text{vp}[\![S]\!](\varphi) \sqsubseteq \text{vp}[\![S]\!](\varphi').$$

Furthermore, HeyVL conservatively extends an existing IVL for non-probabilistic programs due to [Müller \[2019\]](#) in the following sense:

THEOREM 3.3 (CONSERVATIVITY OF HeyVL). *Let C be a program in the programming language of [Müller \[2019\]](#) and let B be a postcondition. Moreover, let $\bar{C}$ be obtained by replacing every assert A and every assume A occurring in C by assert $?(A)$ and assume $?(A)$, respectively (cf. Boolean embeddings, [Section 2.3](#)). Then*

$$\underbrace{?(\text{wp}[\![C]\!](B))}_{\text{verification condition obtained from [Müller 2019]}} \equiv \overbrace{\text{vp}[\![\bar{C}]\!](?(B))}^{\text{HeyVL}}.$$

3.5 Procedure Calls

We conclude this section with a treatment of (co)procedure calls. Consider a callee *procedure* P as shown in [Figure 15](#). Intuitively, the effect of a call $z_1, \dots, z_m := P(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ corresponds to (1) initializing P 's formal input parameters $x_1, \dots, x_n$ with the arguments $t_1, \dots, t_n$, (2) inlining

P 's body S , and (3) assigning to $z_1, \dots, z_m$ the values of outputs $y_1, \dots, y_m$. The semantics of $z_1, \dots, z_m := P(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ can be thought of as the statement¹⁴

$$\underbrace{x_1 := t_1; \dots; x_n := t_n; \quad \overbrace{S}^{\text{inlining of the procedure body}} \quad z_1 := y_1; \dots; z_m := y_m}_{\text{=: init (initialize procedure inputs) \quad \quad \quad =: return (assign procedure outputs)}}$$

There are two main issues that arise when we would actually inline S at every call-site: (1) For recursive procedure calls [Olmedo et al. 2016], we would need to define a (non-computable) fixed point semantics for the vp transformer. Our goal, however, is to render verification feasible in practice, so we would like to avoid fixed point computations. (2) Even without recursive calls, we would have to re-verify S at every call-site, which would not scale.

We thus do not inline the procedure body but use an *encoding* S_{encoding} which *underapproximates* the effect of S in the sense that $\text{vp}[\![S_{\text{encoding}}]\!](\varphi) \sqsubseteq \text{vp}[\![S]\!](\varphi)$ for all HeyLo formulae φ . By monotonicity of vp, we can then verify lower bounds for calls: for all $\varphi, \gamma \in \text{HeyLo}$,

$$\gamma \sqsubseteq \underbrace{\text{vp}[\![\text{init}; S_{\text{encoding}}; \text{return}]\!](\varphi)}_{\text{modular encoding of calls}} \quad \text{implies} \quad \gamma \sqsubseteq \underbrace{\text{vp}[\![\text{init}; S; \text{return}]\!](\varphi)}_{\text{actual inlining of calls}},$$

so whenever we can verify a HeyVL program using the modular encoding, we could have also verified it using inlining. The advantage of the modular encoding is that S_{encoding} does not contain the procedure body – it could be changed without requiring re-verification of call sites, so long as the updated procedure body still adheres to the procedure's specification. To construct S_{encoding} , we leverage only P 's specification pre ρ and post ψ , cf. Figure 15: Assuming that P verifies, we can safely assume that P 's verification condition – namely $\rho \sqsubseteq \text{vp}[\![S]\!](\psi)$ – holds.¹⁵ By monotonicity of vp, we have $\rho \sqsubseteq \text{vp}[\![S]\!](\psi) \sqsubseteq \text{vp}[\![S]\!](\varphi)$ whenever $\psi \sqsubseteq \varphi$ holds. To underapproximate $\text{vp}[\![S]\!](\varphi)$, we construct S_{encoding} such that $\text{vp}[\![S_{\text{encoding}}]\!](\varphi)$ is the known lower bound ρ if $\psi \sqsubseteq \varphi$; otherwise, it is the trivial lower bound 0. So how do we construct S_{encoding} concretely?

In classical verification infrastructures (cf. [Müller 2019]), S_{encoding} corresponds to the statement

$$\text{assert } \rho; \text{havoc } z_1; \dots; \text{havoc } z_m; \text{assume } \psi.$$

That is, we assert the procedure's pre ρ before the call, forget the values of all outputs, i.e. variables that are potentially modified by the call, and assume the procedure's post ψ after the call. Phrased in terms of underapproximations: We assert that we have at most ρ before the call and, while minimising over all possible outputs (using the havoc statements), lower the threshold at which the post is considered entirely true (i.e. ∞) to ψ , i.e. whenever ψ lower-bounds the post.

The intuition underlying the above HeyVL statement works for encoding procedure calls of non-probabilistic programs. However, there is a subtle *unsoundness* that arises when reasoning about *expected* behaviors. Figure 16 shows two procedures, *foo* and *bar*. Intuitively, *foo* flips a fair coin and aborts execution if the result is heads (false). Read backwards, the expected value of the post will be at most x after executing *foo* – exactly as stated in *foo*'s specification. Procedure *bar* encodes the call *foo*(x) in its body¹⁶ and requires in its specification that the expected value of x does not decrease, i.e. is at least x . Both procedures verify. However, when inlining *foo*, i.e. using its body instead of the encoding $\text{assert } x; \text{assume } 2 \cdot x$, *bar* does *not* verify. Hence, the above encoding does, in general, not model a sound underapproximation of a procedure's inlining.

¹⁴For the sake of simplicity, we ignore potential scoping issues arising if S uses variables that are declared in the calling context; these issues can be resolved by a straightforward yet tedious variable renaming.

¹⁵Otherwise, procedure P in Figure 15 does not verify and verification of the whole HeyVL program fails anyway.

¹⁶There are no havoc statements because *foo* has no outputs; we also omitted *init* and *return* for simplicity.

<pre> proc foo (x: $\mathbb{N}$) -> () pre x post $2 \cdot x$ { // verifies: $x \sqsubseteq 2 \cdot x \sqcap 0.5 \cdot \infty$ var b: $\mathbb{B} \approx 0.5 \cdot \langle \text{true} \rangle + 0.5 \cdot \langle \text{false} \rangle$; assert $?(b)$ }</pre>	<pre> proc bar (x: $\mathbb{N}$) -> () pre x post x { // verifies: $x \sqsubseteq x \sqcap (2 \cdot x \rightarrow x)$ // encoding of foo(x) assert x; assume $2 \cdot x$ }</pre>
--	--

Fig. 16. Unsound encoding of a procedure call $\text{foo}(x)$ in bar . Both procedures verify but inlining the body of foo in bar does not as it produces the (wrong) inequality $x \sqsubseteq x \sqcap (0.5 \cdot \infty)$.

Taking a closer look, recall from above that $\text{assume } 2 \cdot x$ is used to encode a monotonicity check,¹⁷ which is an inherently *qualitative* property. However, verifying bar involves proving $x \sqsubseteq x \sqcap (2 \cdot x \rightarrow x)$, where the quantitative implication $2 \cdot x \rightarrow x$ evaluates to x for $x > 0$; the expectation x does not reflect the inherently qualitative nature of the monotonicity check. To fix this issue, we add a *validate* statement that turns *quantitative* results into *qualitative* ones: it reduces any value less than ∞ , which indicates a failed monotonicity check, to 0. An encoding underapproximating the inlining of $\text{foo}(x)$ – and thus correctly failing verification of bar – is $\text{assert } x$; *validate*; $\text{assume } 2 \cdot x$. Similarly to Section 2.4, verifying bar for the fixed encoding involves proving $x \sqsubseteq x \sqcap \Delta(2 \cdot x \rightarrow x)$, which does not hold for $x > 0$.

More generally, a sound construction of S_{encoding} (wrt. underapproximating procedure body S) is

$S_{\text{encoding}}: \quad \text{assert } p; \text{havoc } z_1; \dots; \text{havoc } z_m; \text{validate}; \text{assume } \psi.$

Formally, we obtain an underapproximating HeyVL encoding of procedure calls of the form $z_1, \dots, z_m := P(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ for arbitrary probabilistic procedures as in Figure 15:

THEOREM 3.4. *Let S be the body of the procedure P in Figure 15. Then, for every HeyLo formula φ ,*

$$\text{vp}[\![S_{\text{encoding}}]\!](\varphi) \sqsubseteq \text{vp}[\![S]\!](\varphi) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{vp}[\![\text{init}; S_{\text{encoding}}; \text{return}]\!](\varphi) \sqsubseteq \text{vp}[\![\text{init}; S; \text{return}]\!](\varphi).$$

A HeyVL encoding that *overapproximates* calls of *coprocedures* is analogous – it suffices to use the dual *costatements* in S_{encoding} . The presented under- and overapproximations are useful when encoding proof rules in HeyVL. Whether they are meaningful does, however, depend on the verification technique at hand that should be encoded.

4 ENCODING CASE STUDIES

To evaluate the expressiveness of our verification language, we encoded various existing calculi and proof rules targeting verification problems for probabilistic programs in HeyVL. We will first focus on programs without while loops (Section 4.1) and then consider loops (Section 4.2). The practicality of our automated verification infrastructure will be evaluated separately in Section 5. A summary of all encodings is given at the end of this section.

4.1 Reasoning about While-Loop-Free pGCL Dialects

Pioneered by Kozen [1983], expectation-based techniques have been successfully applied to analyze various probabilistic program properties. McIver and Morgan [2005] incorporated nondeterminism

¹⁷More precisely: a check whether monotonicity of vp can be applied, namely whether $\psi \sqsubseteq \varphi$ holds where ψ is the callee's *specified* post and φ is the *actual* post at the call-site.

C	$enc_{wp}[C]$
skip	reward 0
diverge	assert 0
$x := t$	$x \approx t$
$C_1; C_2$	$enc_{wp}[C_1]; enc_{wp}[C_2]$
if (b) { C_1 } else { C_2 }	if ($\top$) { assume $?(b); enc_{wp}[C_1]$ } else { assume $?(¬b); enc_{wp}[C_2]$ }
{ C_1 } [p] { C_2 }	var $tmp: \mathbb{B} \approx \text{flip}(p);$ $enc_{wp}[\text{if } (tmp) \{C_1\} \text{ else } \{C_2\}]$
{ C_1 } [] { C_2 }	if ($\top$) { C_1 } else { C_2 }

Fig. 17. Encoding of weakest preexpectation for pGCL, where tmp is a fresh variable.

```

proc lower ( $\overline{in}$ ) -> ( $\overline{out}$ )
  pre  $\psi$  //  $\overline{in}$ : variables in  $\psi$ 
  post  $\varphi$  { //  $\overline{out}$ : var. in  $\varphi$  but not  $\psi$ 
    // declare local variables, i.e.
    // those not in  $\varphi$  or  $\psi$ , using
    // var  $x: \tau \approx \text{default}; \text{havoc } x$ 
     $enc_{wp}[C]$ 
  }

```

Fig. 18. Encoding of $\psi \sqsubseteq wp(C, \varphi)$.

and introduced the probabilistic Guarded Command Language (pGCL), which is convenient for modelling probabilistic systems. The syntax of while-loop-free pGCL programs C is¹⁸

$C ::= \text{skip} \mid \text{diverge} \mid x := t \mid C_1; C_2 \mid \text{if } (b) \{C_1\} \text{ else } \{C_2\} \mid \{C_1\} [p] \{C_2\} \mid \{C_1\} [] \{C_2\},$

where skip has no effect, diverge never terminates, $x := t$ assigns the value of term t to x , $C_1; C_2$ executes C_2 after C_1 , if (b) { C_1 } else { C_2 } executes C_1 if Boolean expression b holds and C_2 otherwise, { C_1 } [p] { C_2 } executes C_1 with probability $p \in [0, 1]$ and C_2 with probability $(1 - p)$, and { C_1 } [] { C_2 } nondeterministically executes either C_1 or C_2 .

We now outline encodings of several reasoning techniques targeting pGCL and extensions thereof. We will only consider expectations that can be expressed as HeyLo formulae. To improve readability, we identify every HeyLo formula φ with its expectation $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \in \mathbb{E}$.

Weakest Preexpectations (wp). The *weakest preexpectation calculus* of McIver and Morgan [2005] maps every pGCL command C and postexpectation φ to the *minimal* (to resolve nondeterminism) *expected value* $wp(C, \varphi)$ of φ after termination of C – the same intuition underlying HeyVL’s vp transformer. Figure 17 shows a sound and complete HeyVL encoding $enc_{wp}[C]$ of the weakest preexpectation calculus, i.e. $vp[enc_{wp}[C]](\varphi) = wp(C, \varphi)$. Most pGCL commands have HeyVL equivalents; conditionals are encoded as in Example 3.1. diverge is encoded as assert 0 as it never terminates, i.e. $wp(\text{diverge}, \varphi) = 0$. The program in Figure 18 then verifies iff ψ lower bounds $wp(C, \varphi)$, i.e. $\psi \sqsubseteq wp(C, \varphi)$. To reason about *upper* bounds, it suffices to use a *coprocedure* instead.

Weakest Liberal Preexpectations (wlp). McIver and Morgan [2005] also proposed a *liberal* weakest preexpectation calculus, a partial correctness variant of weakest preexpectations. More precisely, if $\varphi \sqsubseteq 1$, then the weakest liberal preexpectation $wlp(C, \varphi)$ is the expected value of φ after termination of C *plus* the probability of non-termination of C (on a given initial state). We denote by $enc_{wlp}[C]$ the HeyVL encoding of the weakest liberal preexpectation calculus; it is defined analogously to Figure 17 except for diverge. Since diverge never terminates, the probability of non-termination is one, i.e. $wlp(\text{diverge}, \dots) = 1$. The updated encoding of diverge is

$$enc_{wlp}[\text{diverge}] = \text{assert } 1; \text{ assume } 0,$$

¹⁸pGCL usually supports only one type, e.g. integers, rationals, or reals. We are more liberal and admit arbitrary terms t but assume a sufficiently strong type inference system and consider only well-typed programs.

```

{ a := 0 } [0.5] { a := 1 };
{ b := 0 } [0.5] { b := 1 };
{ c := 0 } [0.5] { c := 1 };
r := 4 · a + 2 · b + c + 1;
observe r ≤ 6

```

Fig. 19. pGCL program C_{die} .

```

var a :  $\mathbb{N}$   $\approx$  0.5 · ⟨1⟩ + 0.5 · ⟨0⟩;
var b :  $\mathbb{N}$   $\approx$  0.5 · ⟨1⟩ + 0.5 · ⟨0⟩;
var c :  $\mathbb{N}$   $\approx$  0.5 · ⟨1⟩ + 0.5 · ⟨0⟩;
r  $\approx$  4 · a + 2 · b + c + 1;
assert ?(r ≤ 6)

```

Fig. 20. HeyVL encoding S_{die} of C_{die} .

```

coproc die_wp () -> (r : UInt)
pre 2.625
post r
{  $S_{die}$  }

```

```

proc die_wlp () -> (r : UInt)
pre 6/8
post 1
{  $S_{die}$  }

```

Fig. 21. HeyVL encoding of the proof obligations $wp[C_{die}](r) \sqsubseteq 2.625$ and $0.75 \sqsubseteq wlp[C_{die}](1)$.

where `assert 1` ensures one-boundedness and `assume 0` lowers the threshold at which the post is considered entirely true to 0. Put together, we have $vp[enc_{wlp}[\text{diverge}]](\varphi) = 1 \sqcap \infty = 1 = wlp(\text{diverge}, \varphi)$.

Conditional Preexpectations (cwp). Conditioning on observed events (in the sense of conditional probabilities) is a key feature of modern probabilistic programming languages [Gordon et al. 2014]. Intuitively, the statement `observe b` discards an execution whenever Boolean expression b does not hold. Moreover, it re-normalizes such that the accumulated probability of all executions violating no observation equals one. Olmedo et al. [2018] showed that reasoning about `observe b` requires a combination of wp and wlp reasoning. They extended both calculi such that violating an observation is interpreted as a failure resulting in pre-expectation zero; we can encode it with an assertion:

$$w(l)p(\text{observe } b, \varphi) = ?(b) \sqcap \varphi = vp[\text{assert } ?(b)](\varphi).$$

For every pGCL program C with observe statements, initial state σ and expectation φ , the *conditional* expected value $cwp(C, \varphi)(\sigma)$ of φ after termination of C is then given by the expected value $wp(C, \varphi)(\sigma)$ normalized by the probability $wlp(C, 1)(\sigma)$ of violating no observation:

$$cwp(C, \varphi)(\sigma) = \frac{wp(C, \varphi)(\sigma)}{wlp(C, 1)(\sigma)} \quad (\text{undefined if } wlp(C, 1)(\sigma) = 0)$$

We can re-use our existing HeyVL encodings to reason about conditional expected values. Notice that proving bounds on cwp requires establishing both lower and upper bounds. For example, the pGCL program C_{die} in Figure 19 assigns to r the result of a six-sided die roll, which is simulated using three fair coin flips and an observation. To show that the expected value of r is at most 3.5 – the expected value of a six-sided die roll – we prove the upper bound $wp(C_{die}, r) \sqsubseteq 2.625$ and the lower bound $0.75 \sqsubseteq wlp(C_{die}, 1)$. Then, $cwp(C_{die}, r) \sqsubseteq \frac{2.625}{0.75} = 3.5$. Figure 20 shows the HeyVL encoding of C_{die} (cleaned up for readability). As shown in Figure 21, the proof obligations $wp(C_{die}, r) \sqsubseteq 2.625$ and $0.75 \sqsubseteq wlp(C_{die}, 1)$ are then encoded using a coprocedure for the upper bound and a procedure for the lower bound, respectively.

There exist alternative interpretations of conditioning. For instance, Nori et al. [2014] use $wp(C, 1)(\sigma)$ in the denominator in the above fraction. A benefit of HeyVL is that such alternative interpretations can be realized by a straightforward adaptation of our encoding.

```

assert  $I$ ;
havoc  $\text{variables}$ ;
validate;
assume  $I$ ;
if ( $b$ ) {
   $\text{enc}_{\text{wlp}}[C]$ ;
  assert  $I$ ;
  assume  $?(false)$ 
} else { } //  $\varphi$ 

```

Fig. 22. Encoding of Park Induction rule for underapproximating $\text{wlp}(\text{while } (b) \{C\}, \varphi)$.

```

coassert  $\text{exp}(0.5, \text{len}(l))$ ;
cohavoc  $l$ ; cohavoc  $\text{tmp}$ ;
covalidate;
coassume  $\text{len}(l)$ ;
if ( $\text{len}(l) > 0$ ) {
  var  $\text{tmp} : \mathbb{B} := \text{flip}(0.5)$ 
  if ( $\text{tmp}$ ) {  $l := \text{tail}(l)$  } else { assert 0 }
  coassert  $\text{exp}(0.5, \text{len}(l))$ ; coassume  $\text{co}?(false)$ 
} else { } // 1

```

Fig. 23. Exemplary HeyVL encoding overapproximating the wp of a loop.

4.2 Reasoning about Expected Values of Loops

We encoded various proof rules for loops $\text{while } (b) \{C\}$ in HeyVL. As an example, we consider the Park induction rule [Kaminski 2019; Park 1969] for lower bounds on weakest liberal preexpectations: for all $\varphi, I \sqsubseteq 1$,

$$\underbrace{I \sqsubseteq (? (b) \rightarrow \text{wlp}(C, I)) \sqcap (? (\neg b) \rightarrow \varphi)}_{I \text{ is an inductive invariant}} \text{ implies } \underbrace{I \sqsubseteq \text{wlp}(\text{while } (b) \{C\}, \varphi)}_{I \text{ underapproximates the loop's wlp}}.$$

The rule can be viewed as a quantitative version of the loop rule from Hoare [1969] logic, where I is an *inductive invariant* underapproximating the expected value of any loop iteration. Figure 22 depicts an encoding $\text{enc}_{\text{wlp}}[\text{while } (b) \{C\}]$ that underapproximates $\text{wlp}(\text{while } (b) \{C\}, \varphi)$, i.e.

$$\text{vp}[\text{enc}_{\text{wlp}}[\text{while } (b) \{C\}]](\varphi) = \begin{cases} I, & \text{if } I \sqsubseteq (? (b) \rightarrow \text{wlp}(C, I)) \sqcap (? (\neg b) \rightarrow \varphi) \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \sqsubseteq \text{wlp}(\dots, \varphi).$$

Before we go into details, we remark for readers familiar with classical deductive verification that our encoding is almost identical to standard loop encodings (cf. [Müller 2019]). Apart from the quantitative interpretation of statements, the only exception is the **validate** in line 3.

It is instructive to go over the encoding in Figure 22 step by step for a given initial state σ . The following expanded version of the above equation's right-hand side serves as a roadmap:

$$I(\sigma) \sqcap \inf_{\sigma' \in \text{States}} \begin{cases} \infty, & \text{if } I(\sigma') \leq (? (b)(\sigma') \rightarrow \text{wlp}(C, I)(\sigma')) \sqcap (? (\neg b)(\sigma') \rightarrow \varphi(\sigma')) \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

Reading the HeyVL code in Figure 22 top-down then corresponds to reading the equation from left to right as indicated by the colors. We first **assert** that our underapproximation of the loop's wlp is at most I . The remaining code will ensure that said underapproximation is exactly I whenever I is an inductive loop invariant; it will be 0 otherwise. Proving that I is an inductive loop invariant requires checking an inequality $\sqsubseteq$, where $\psi \sqsubseteq \rho$ holds iff $\psi(\sigma') \leq \rho(\sigma')$ for all states σ' . We **havoc** the values of all program variables such that the invariant check encoded afterward is performed for every evaluation of the program variables, i.e. for every state σ' .¹⁹ Moreover, **havoc** picks the

¹⁹An optimized encoding may only havoc those variables that are modified in the loop body. However, we opted to encode the rule as it is typically presented in the literature.

minimal result of all those invariant checks. The statement “ I is an inductive loop invariant” is inherently qualitative. We thus **validate** that the invariant check encoded next is a qualitative statement that can only have two results: ∞ if I is an inductive invariant and 0 if it is not. To check if I is an inductive invariant for a fixed state σ' , we need to prove an inequality, namely that $I(\sigma')$ lower bounds $\text{wlp}(C, I)(\sigma')$ if loop guard b holds and $\varphi(\sigma')$ if b does not hold. We first use **assume** I to lower the threshold for the expected value of the remaining code to be considered ∞ to $I(\sigma')$. Hence, we obtain ∞ if the invariant check succeeds for σ' . The **conditional choice** is the invariant check’s right-hand side. If state σ' satisfies b , we use our existing wlp encoding to compute $\text{wlp}(C, I)(\sigma')$, where **assert** I ; **assume** $?(false)$ ensures that wlp is computed with respect to postexpectation I . If state σ' satisfies $\neg b$, we do nothing and just take the postexpectation φ .

Upper bounds. Consider an iterative version of the lossy list traversal from Figure 4 on page 3:

```
while (len(l) > 0) { { l := pop(l) } [0.5] { foo(l) } }
```

The Park induction rule can also be used to overapproximate weakest preexpectations. The encoding is dual, i.e. it suffices to use the *co*-versions of the involved statements. For example, Figure 23 encodes the above loop with $\text{exp}(0.5, \text{len}(l))$ as inductive invariant overapproximating the loop’s termination probability. The list type and the exponential function $\text{exp}(0.5, \text{len}(l))$ are represented in HeyLo by custom domain declarations (cf. Section 5.1).

Recursion. We can encode verification of wlp -lower bounds for recursive procedure calls of pGCL programs as discussed in Section 3.5 and justified by Olmedo et al. [2016] and Matheja [2020] – it is another application of Park induction. For wp -upper bounds, the encoding is dual. Hence, Figure 7 on page 5 encodes that the termination probability of the program in Figure 4 is at most $0.5^{\text{len}(l)}$.

4.3 Overview of Encodings

Table 1 summarizes all verification techniques – program logics and proof rules – that have been encoded in HeyVL. While a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, we briefly go over Table 1. The main takeaway is that HeyVL enables the encoding – and thus automation – of advanced verification methods based on diverse theoretical foundations and targeting different verification problems. The practicality of our encodings will be evaluated in Section 5.

Expected Values. We encoded McIver and Morgan [2005]’s weakest (liberal) preexpectation calculus for analyzing expected values of probabilistic programs (cf. Section 4.1). To analyze *conditional* expected values, we combined the two calculi as suggested by Olmedo et al. [2018]. For loops, we encoded three proof rules based on domain theory:

First, *Park Induction* generalizes the standard loop rule from Hoare logic [Hoare 1969] to a quantitative setting; it can be applied to lower bound weakest liberal preexpectations and upper bound weakest preexpectations (cf. Section 4.2). However, it is unsound for the converse directions.

Second, ω -*Invariants* are sound and complete for proving lower and upper bounds. However, they are arguably more complex because users must provide a family of invariants and compute limits. We modeled families of invariants as HeyLo formulas with additional free variables and used $\text{havoc } x$ and $\text{cohavoc } x$ to represent limits.

Third, we encoded a quantitative version of *k-induction* (for proving upper bounds) – an established verification technique (cf. [Sheeran et al. 2000]). The encodings are based on latticed *k-induction* [Batz et al. 2021a], a generalization of *k-induction* to arbitrary complete lattices. After encoding *k-induction* for upper bounds on wp , we benefited from the duality of HeyVL statements: we obtained a dual encoding for lower bounds on wlp that has, to our knowledge, not been implemented before. Furthermore, we encoded an advanced proof rule for lower bounds on expected

Table 1. Verification techniques encoded in HeyVL sorted by verification problem: lower- and upper bounds on probability of events (LPROB and UPROB), upper- and lower bounds on expected values (UEXP and LEXP), conditional expected values (CEXP), almost-sure termination (AST), positive almost-sure termination (PAST), upper bounds on expected runtimes (UERT), and lower bounds on expected runtimes (LERT).

Problem	Verification Technique	Source
LPROB	wlp + Park induction wlp + latticed k -induction	McIver and Morgan [2005] (new?)
UPROB	wlp + ω -invariants	Kaminski [2019]
UEXP	wp + Park induction wp + latticed k -induction	McIver and Morgan [2005] Batz et al. [2021a]
LEXP	wp + ω -invariants wp + Optional Stopping Theorem	Kaminski [2019] Hark et al. [2019]
CEXP	conditional wp	Olmedo et al. [2018]
UERT	ert calculus + UEXP rules	Kaminski et al. [2016]
LERT	ert calculus + ω -invariants	Kaminski et al. [2016]
AST	parametric super-martingale rule	McIver et al. [2018]
PAST	program analysis with martingales	Chakarov and Sankaranarayanan [2013]

values by Hark et al. [2019]. In contrast to the above rules, this rule is based on stochastic processes, particularly the Optional Stopping Theorem. Using our encoding, we automated the main examples in [Hark et al. 2019].

Expected Runtimes. To analyze the performance of randomized algorithms, we encoded the expected runtime calculus by Kaminski et al. [2016, 2018] and its recent extension to amortized analysis [Batz et al. 2023b]. Although reasoning about expected runtimes of loops involves some subtleties, we could adapt our HeyVL encodings for expected values by inserting reward statements. We encoded and automated examples from [Kaminski et al. 2016, 2018] and [Ngo et al. 2018].

Almost-Sure Termination (AST). McIver et al. [2018] proposed a proof rule for almost-sure termination – does a probabilistic program terminate with probability one? The rule is based on a parametric martingale that must satisfy four conditions, which we encoded in separate HeyVL (co)procedures. We automated the verification of their examples, including the one in Figure 5.

Positive Almost-Sure Termination (PAST). PAST is a stronger notion than almost-sure termination, which requires a program’s expected runtime to be finite. We can apply our HeyVL encodings for upper bounding expected runtimes to prove PAST. Moreover, we encoded a dedicated proof rule for PAST by Chakarov and Sankaranarayanan [2013] based on martingales and concentration bounds.

5 IMPLEMENTATION

We first describe user-defined types and functions by means of *domain declarations* in Section 5.1. We then describe our tool CAESAR alongside with empirical results validating the feasibility of our deductive verification infrastructure for the automated verification of probabilistic programs.

5.1 Domain Declarations

Recall from Section 2 that we assume all type- and function symbols to be interpreted. In practice, we support custom first-order theories via *domain declarations* as is standard in classical deductive

verification infrastructures [Müller et al. 2016b]. A domain declaration introduces a new type symbol alongside with a set of typed function symbols and first-order formulae (called *axioms*) characterizing feasible interpretations of the type- and function symbols.

Consider the harmonic numbers — often required for, e.g., expected runtime analysis — as an example. The n -th harmonic number is given by $H_n = \sum_{k=1}^n \frac{1}{k}$. To enable reasoning about verification problems involving the harmonic numbers, we introduce the following domain declaration:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{domain } \textit{HarmonicNums} \{ & \text{func } H(n: \mathbb{N}): \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \\ & \text{axiom } h_0 \ H(0) = 0 \\ & \text{axiom } h_n \ \forall n: \mathbb{N}. H(n+1) = H(n) + 1/n+1 \quad \} \end{array}$$

HarmonicNums introduces a new function symbol $H: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ and two axioms h_0 and h_n characterizing feasible interpretations of H recursively. Other non-linear functions such as exponential functions (e.g., $\exp(0.5, n)$ from Section 4.2) as well as algebraic data types can be defined in a similar way (see, e.g., [Müller et al. 2016a]). In our implementation, validity of verification conditions — inequalities between HeyLo formulae — is defined *modulo* validity of all user-provided axioms.

5.2 The Verifier CAESAR

We have implemented HeyVL in our tool CAESAR²⁰ which consists of approximately 10k lines of Rust code. CAESAR takes as input a HeyVL program C and a set of domain declarations (cf. Section 5.1). It then generates all verification conditions described by C , i.e., inequalities between HeyLo formulae of the form $\varphi \sqsubseteq \text{vp}[\![S]\!](\psi)$ or $\varphi \sqsupseteq \text{vp}[\![S]\!](\psi)$, and translates these verification conditions to a Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) query. Our SMT back end is z3 [de Moura and Bjørner 2008]. Since the translation to SMT can involve undecidable theories, CAESAR might return *unknown*. Otherwise, CAESAR either returns *verified* or *not verified*. In the latter case, z3 often reports a counterexample state witnessing the violation of one of the verification conditions, which helps, e.g., debugging loop invariants.

Moreover, we have implemented a *prototypical front-end* that translates (numeric) pGCL programs and their specifications to HeyVL, and invokes CAESAR for automated verification. Currently, it supports all techniques from Table 1 targeting loops.

SMT Encodings and Optimizations. We translate validity of inequalities between HeyLo to SMT following the semantics of formulae from Figure 8.

To encode the sort $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^\infty$, we evaluated to two options, which are both supported by our implementation. The first option represents every number of sort $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^\infty$ as a pair $(r, \textit{isInfy})$, where r is a real number and *isInfy* is a Boolean flag that is true if and only if the represented number is equal to ∞ . We add constraints $r \geq 0$ to ensure that r is non-negative. All operations on $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^\infty$ are then defined over such pairs. For example, the addition $(r_1, \textit{isInfy}_1) + (r_2, \textit{isInfy}_2)$ is defined as $(r_1 + r_2, \textit{isInfy}_1 \vee \textit{isInfy}_2)$. For multiplication, we ensure that $0 \cdot \infty = \infty$ — a common assumption in probability theory. The second option leverages Z3-specific data type declarations to specify values that are either infinite or non-negative reals. We observed that the first option performs better overall and thus use it by default.

The $\mathcal{L}$ - and $\mathcal{O}$ quantifiers are translated using the textbook definition of infima and suprema over $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^\infty$, but are eliminated whenever possible using that for $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^\infty$ and $r \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^\infty$, we have

$$\sup A \leq r \quad \text{iff} \quad \forall a \in A: a \leq r \quad \text{and dually} \quad r \leq \inf A \quad \text{iff} \quad \forall a \in A: r \leq a.$$

Finally, we simplify sub-formulae by, e.g., rewriting $?(b) \sqcap \psi$ to 0 if b is unsatisfiable.

²⁰ All tools and benchmarks are available as open-source software at <https://github.com/moves-rwth/caesar>.

Benchmarks. To validate whether our implementation is capable of verifying interesting quantitative properties of probabilistic programs, we have considered various verification problems taken from the literature. These benchmarks involve unbounded probabilistic loops or recursion and include quantitative correctness properties of communication protocols [D’Argenio et al. 1997; Helmink et al. 1993] and randomised algorithms [Hurd et al. 2005; Kushilevitz and Rabin 1992; Lumbroso 2013], bounds on expected runtimes of stochastic processes [Kaminski et al. 2020, 2018; Ngo et al. 2018], proofs of *positive* almost-sure termination [Chakarov and Sankaranarayanan 2013] and proofs of almost-sure termination for the case studies provided in [McIver et al. 2018]. For each of these benchmarks, we wrote HeyVL encodings, including the ones in Section 4, and cover all verification techniques from Table 1.

Table 2 summarizes the results of our benchmarks. For each benchmark, it provides the benchmark name, the verification problem, the encoded techniques (cf. Table 1), the lines of HeyVL code (without comments), notable features, and running time. For the running time, we also provide the shares of pruning, i.e. simplification of sub-formulae, and the final SAT check. Details about each benchmark’s source and encoding are found in the technical report. For latticed k -induction, we indicate the value of k that was used for the encoding. Benchmarks that use exponential functions (e.g. rabin, zeroconf) or harmonic numbers (e.g. ast) are marked with F1. Benchmarks that use multiple possibly mixed (co)procedures are marked with F2. One example encodes verification of nested loops (feature F3).

The size of our benchmarks ranges from 19-224 lines of HeyVL code. 85% of our benchmarks (those shaded in gray) have been verified with our front-end; the remaining encodings are handcrafted. All benchmark files are available as part of our artifact.

Evaluation. On average, CAESAR needs 0.2 seconds to verify a HeyVL program, with a maximum of 2.3 seconds. Most benchmarks verify within less than a second. The brp3 benchmark times out because of the large nested branching resulting from the exponential size of the k -induction encoding with $k = 23$.

We conclude that CAESAR is capable of verifying interesting quantitative verification problems of probabilistic programs taken from the literature. Moreover, we conclude that modern SMT solvers are a suitable back-end besides the fact that our benchmarks often require reasoning about highly non-linear functions. This is due to the fact that it often suffices to (un)fold recursive definitions of, e.g., the harmonic numbers, finitely many times. Finally, our benchmarks demonstrate that our verification infrastructure provides a unifying interface for *encoding and solving* various kinds of probabilistic verification problems in an automated manner.

6 RELATED WORK

We focus on automated verification techniques for probabilistic programs and deductive verification infrastructures for non-probabilistic programs; encoded proof rules have been discussed in Section 4.

Probabilistic Program Verification. Expectation-based probabilistic program verification has been pioneered by Kozen [1983, 1985] and McIver & Morgan [McIver and Morgan 2005]. Hurd et al. [2005] formalised the $w(l)p$ calculus in *Isabelle/HOL* [Nipkow et al. 2002]. They focus on the calculus’ meta theory and provide a verification-condition generator for proving partial correctness. Hölzl [2016] implemented the meta theory of Kaminski et al. [2016]’s ert calculus in *Isabelle/HOL* and verified bounds on expected runtimes of randomised algorithms. We focus on unifying verification techniques in a single infrastructure.

Easycrypt [Barthe et al. 2013, 2011] is a theorem prover for verifying cryptographic protocols, featuring libraries for data structures and algebraic reasoning. *Ellora* [Barthe et al. 2018] is an assertion-based program logic for probabilistic programs implemented in *Easycrypt*, taking benefit

Table 2. Benchmarks. Rows shaded in gray indicate HeyVL examples automatically generated from pGCL code with annotations using our frontend. Timeout (TO) was set to 10 seconds. Verification techniques correspond to those presented in Table 1. Lines of HeyVL code (LOC) are counted without comments. Features: user-defined uninterpreted functions (F1), multiple (co)procedures (F2), nested loops (F3).

Name	Problem	Verification Technique	LOC	Features	Total (s)	Pruning	SAT
rabin	LPROB	wlp + Park induction	43	F1, F3	0.33	3%	96%
unif_gen1	LPROB	wlp + Latticed k -induction ($k = 2$)	61		0.02	52%	35%
unif_gen2	LPROB	wlp + Latticed k -induction ($k = 3$)	82		0.05	68%	25%
unif_gen3	LPROB	wlp + Latticed k -induction ($k = 3$)	82		0.05	71%	22%
unif_gen4	LPROB	wlp + Latticed k -induction ($k = 5$)	124		0.86	90%	7%
rabin1	LPROB	wlp + Park induction	36		0.01	45%	40%
rabin2	LPROB	wlp + Latticed k -induction ($k = 5$)	116		0.08	27%	67%
chain	UEXP	wp + Park induction	28	F1	0.03	24%	66%
ohfive	UEXP	wp + Park induction	34	F1, F3	0.02	33%	56%
brp1	UEXP	wp + Latticed k -induction ($k = 5$)	72		0.03	45%	42%
brp2	UEXP	wp + Latticed k -induction ($k = 11$)	138		0.46	70%	16%
brp3	UEXP	wp + Latticed k -induction ($k = 23$)	270		TO		
geo1	UEXP	wp + Latticed k -induction ($k = 2$)	32		0.02	44%	41%
geo (recursive)	UEXP	wp + Park induction	19		0.02	43%	42%
rabin1	UEXP	wp + Park induction	36		0.02	44%	73%
rabin2	UEXP	wp + Latticed k -induction ($k = 5$)	116		0.12	22%	46%
unif_gen1	UEXP	wp + Latticed k -induction ($k = 2$)	61		0.03	44%	46%
unif_gen2	UEXP	wp + Latticed k -induction ($k = 3$)	82		0.11	41%	53%
unif_gen3	UEXP	wp + Latticed k -induction ($k = 3$)	82		0.10	41%	53%
unif_gen4	UEXP	wp + Latticed k -induction ($k = 5$)	124		2.26	47%	49%
zeroconf	UEXP	wp + Park induction	43	F1, F2	0.03	36%	49%
ost	LEXP	wp + Optional Stopping Theorem	93	F2	0.07	33%	51%
die	CEXP	conditional wp	22	F2	0.02	17%	63%
2drwalk	UERT	ert + Park induction	224		0.02	41%	44%
bayesian_network	UERT	ert + Park induction	107		0.02	45%	40%
C4b_t303	UERT	ert + Latticed k -induction ($k = 3$)	73		0.03	29%	58%
condand	UERT	ert + Park induction	24		0.02	42%	42%
fcall	UERT	ert + Park induction	26		0.02	52%	44%
hyper	UERT	ert + Park induction	31		0.02	41%	44%
linear01	UERT	ert + Park induction	23		0.02	42%	43%
prdwalk	UERT	ert + Park induction	62		0.02	56%	31%
prspeed	UERT	ert + Park induction	45		0.02	41%	45%
rdspeed	UERT	ert + Park induction	48		0.02	38%	47%
rdwalk	UERT	ert + Park induction	24		0.02	42%	43%
sprdwalk	UERT	ert + Park induction	26		0.02	42%	43%
omega	LERT	ert + ω -invariants	33	F2	0.02	42%	47%
ast1	AST	parametric super-martingale rule	67	F2	0.06	33%	49%
ast2	AST	parametric super-martingale rule	79	F2	0.05	38%	50%
ast3	AST	parametric super-martingale rule	65	F1, F2	1.94	1%	99%
ast4	AST	parametric super-martingale rule	55	F2	0.05	33%	52%
past	PAST	program analysis with martingales	26	F2	0.04	40%	46%

from *Easycrypt*'s features. Their specifications are predicates over (sub)distributions instead of expectations. While *Ellora* employs *specialised* proof rules for loops and does not support non-determinism or recursion, thus being more restrictive than HeyVL in this regard, *Ellora* embeds, e.g., logics for reasoning about probabilistic independence. As stated in [Barthe et al. 2018], an in-depth comparison of assertion- and expectation-based approaches is difficult. Pardo et al. [2022] propose a

propositional dynamic logic for pGCL featuring reasoning about convergence of estimators. Their logic is not automated yet.

Fully automatic analyses of probabilistic programs are limited to specific properties, e.g. bounding expected runtimes or proving (positive) almost-sure termination [Abate et al. 2021; Avanzini et al. 2020; Batz et al. 2023a, 2018; Chatterjee et al. 2016, 2017; Fioriti and Hermanns 2015; Fu and Chatterjee 2019; Leutgeb et al. 2022; Meyer et al. 2021; Moosbrugger et al. 2021a,b; Ngo et al. 2018]. We might also benefit from invariant synthesis approaches [Agrawal et al. 2018; Amrollahi et al. 2022; Bao et al. 2022; Barthe et al. 2016; Bartocci et al. 2020; Batz et al. 2023a, 2020; Chakarov and Sankaranarayanan 2013; Chen et al. 2015; Feng et al. 2017; Katoen et al. 2010; Susag et al. 2022].

Deductive Verification Infrastructures. BOOGIE [Leino 2008] and WHY3 [Filliâtre and Paskevich 2013] are prominent examples of IVLs for non-probabilistic programs that lie at the foundation of various modern verifiers, such as DAFNY [Leino 2010] and FRAMA-C [Kirchner et al. 2015]. Neither of these IVLs targets reasoning about expectations or upper bounds (aka necessary preconditions [Cousot et al. 2011]). For example, BOOGIE’s statements are specific to verifying lower bounds on Boolean predicates. Evaluating whether our implementation could benefit from encoding HeyLo formulae into WHY3 is interesting future work.

7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We have presented a verification infrastructure for probabilistic programs based on a novel quantitative intermediate verification language that aids researchers with prototyping and automating their proof rules. As future work, we plan to automate more rules and explore the relationship between our language, particularly its dual operators, and (partial) incorrectness logic [O’Hearn 2020; Zhang and Kaminski 2022]. A further promising direction is to generalize our infrastructure for the verification of probabilistic pointer programs [Batz et al. 2022a, 2019] and weighted programs [Batz et al. 2022b].

Furthermore, establishing a formal “ground truth” for our intermediate language HeyVL in terms of an operational semantics that assigns precise meaning to quantitative Hoare triples, which we admittedly introduced ad-hoc, is important future work. However, defining an operational semantics that yields a *pleasant forward-reading* intuition for all statements in our intermediate language HeyVL appears non-trivial. In particular, we are unaware of a semantics for (co)assume statements that is independent of the semantics of the remaining program. We believe that stochastic games might be an adequate formalism but the details have not been worked out yet.

DATA-AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The tool CAESAR, our prototypical front-end for pGCL programs, as well as our benchmarks that we submitted for the artifact evaluation are available [Schroer et al. 2023]. We also develop our tools as open-source software at <https://github.com/moves-rwth/caesar>.

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