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TY  - THES
AU  - Klabes, Sebastian Georg
TI  - Algorithmic railway capacity allocation in a competitive European railway market
CY  - Aachen
PB  - Publikationsserver der RWTH Aachen University
M1  - RWTH-CONV-113826
SP  - 209 S. : graph. Darst.
PY  - 2010
N1  - Aachen, Techn. Hochsch., Diss., 2010
AB  - The induced liberalisation process within the European railway system severely affects the railway infrastructure capacity allocation procedure. In the past a single and often governmental owned integrated railway company planned, built and operated a national railway system. The liberalisation process led to a segregation of the integrated railway companies into railway infrastructure manager and railway undertaking in many European Countries. The open access paradigm for railway infrastructure capacity that grants any licensed railway undertaking access to the railway infrastructure capacity induces competition between different railway undertakings trying to acquire railway infrastructure capacity. Recent figures indicate that more railway undertakings emerge and do request railway infrastructure capacity. Their increasing share of uncoordinated request for railway infrastructure capacity increases the complexity of the coordination phase of the railway infrastructure capacity allocation process. In this phase the railway infrastructure manager needs to adjust train path requests in a way to resolve conflicting requests for railway infrastructure capacity. This work introduces an algorithmic framework that shall provide efficient measures to support the railway capacity allocation process and to analyse different allocation procedures. In order to make algorithmic approaches applicable in this domain of railway engineering a sophisticated modelling approach for railway infrastructure capacity is extended in order to account for the objectives of the railway undertakings participating on the secondary railway market for railway infrastructure capacity. The objectives for railway capacity allocation are formulated from the point of view of the railway undertakings submitting train path requests. These objectives account for the negative effects due to adjustments applied to their train path requests during the coordination phase of the railway capacity allocation process. The formalised railway capacity allocation process can be optimised globally, by taking into account standardised objectives with help of algorithmic approaches introduced in this work. However, due to the required confidentiality of information provided by the railway undertakings to the railway infrastructure manager, a global optimisation, taking into account the real objectives of all railway undertakings is not applicable. In order to allow for incorporating the real objectives of the railway undertakings a game theoretical setting is formulated: the railway undertakings are players acting on the secondary railway market for railway infrastructure capacity. Assuming that these players act rationally, such a game theoretical setting always leads to a result, where no player can further improve his situation. Such a solution of the game is a Nash Equilibrium. Comparing the obtained Nash Equilibria of the game theoretical setting to the optimal solution obtained by global optimisation techniques gives an indication of the negative effect of non-cooperative behaviour in such a competitive market for railway capacity allocation. Moreover, it will be shown how the algorithmic framework for railway capacity allocation can be used to determine the degree of congestion of a railway system, based on the submitted train path requests and standardised objectives.
KW  - Schienenverkehr (SWD)
KW  - Optimierung (SWD)
KW  - Spieltheorie (SWD)
LB  - PUB:(DE-HGF)11
UR  - https://publications.rwth-aachen.de/record/51543
ER  -