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@PHDTHESIS{Klabes:51543,
      author       = {Klabes, Sebastian Georg},
      othercontributors = {Wendler, Ekkehard},
      title        = {{A}lgorithmic railway capacity allocation in a competitive
                      {E}uropean railway market},
      address      = {Aachen},
      publisher    = {Publikationsserver der RWTH Aachen University},
      reportid     = {RWTH-CONV-113826},
      pages        = {209 S. : graph. Darst.},
      year         = {2010},
      note         = {Aachen, Techn. Hochsch., Diss., 2010},
      abstract     = {The induced liberalisation process within the European
                      railway system severely affects the railway infrastructure
                      capacity allocation procedure. In the past a single and
                      often governmental owned integrated railway company planned,
                      built and operated a national railway system. The
                      liberalisation process led to a segregation of the
                      integrated railway companies into railway infrastructure
                      manager and railway undertaking in many European Countries.
                      The open access paradigm for railway infrastructure capacity
                      that grants any licensed railway undertaking access to the
                      railway infrastructure capacity induces competition between
                      different railway undertakings trying to acquire railway
                      infrastructure capacity. Recent figures indicate that more
                      railway undertakings emerge and do request railway
                      infrastructure capacity. Their increasing share of
                      uncoordinated request for railway infrastructure capacity
                      increases the complexity of the coordination phase of the
                      railway infrastructure capacity allocation process. In this
                      phase the railway infrastructure manager needs to adjust
                      train path requests in a way to resolve conflicting requests
                      for railway infrastructure capacity. This work introduces an
                      algorithmic framework that shall provide efficient measures
                      to support the railway capacity allocation process and to
                      analyse different allocation procedures. In order to make
                      algorithmic approaches applicable in this domain of railway
                      engineering a sophisticated modelling approach for railway
                      infrastructure capacity is extended in order to account for
                      the objectives of the railway undertakings participating on
                      the secondary railway market for railway infrastructure
                      capacity. The objectives for railway capacity allocation are
                      formulated from the point of view of the railway
                      undertakings submitting train path requests. These
                      objectives account for the negative effects due to
                      adjustments applied to their train path requests during the
                      coordination phase of the railway capacity allocation
                      process. The formalised railway capacity allocation process
                      can be optimised globally, by taking into account
                      standardised objectives with help of algorithmic approaches
                      introduced in this work. However, due to the required
                      confidentiality of information provided by the railway
                      undertakings to the railway infrastructure manager, a global
                      optimisation, taking into account the real objectives of all
                      railway undertakings is not applicable. In order to allow
                      for incorporating the real objectives of the railway
                      undertakings a game theoretical setting is formulated: the
                      railway undertakings are players acting on the secondary
                      railway market for railway infrastructure capacity. Assuming
                      that these players act rationally, such a game theoretical
                      setting always leads to a result, where no player can
                      further improve his situation. Such a solution of the game
                      is a Nash Equilibrium. Comparing the obtained Nash
                      Equilibria of the game theoretical setting to the optimal
                      solution obtained by global optimisation techniques gives an
                      indication of the negative effect of non-cooperative
                      behaviour in such a competitive market for railway capacity
                      allocation. Moreover, it will be shown how the algorithmic
                      framework for railway capacity allocation can be used to
                      determine the degree of congestion of a railway system,
                      based on the submitted train path requests and standardised
                      objectives.},
      keywords     = {Schienenverkehr (SWD) / Optimierung (SWD) / Spieltheorie
                      (SWD)},
      cin          = {313110},
      ddc          = {620},
      cid          = {$I:(DE-82)313110_20140620$},
      shelfmark    = {J.6},
      typ          = {PUB:(DE-HGF)11},
      urn          = {urn:nbn:de:hbz:82-opus-31341},
      url          = {https://publications.rwth-aachen.de/record/51543},
}