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TY - THES AU - Dorsch, Marianne Cornelia TI - Das Leib-Seele-Problem im medizinhistorischen Kontext : ein kritischer Vergleich von René Descartes und António Damásio PB - RWTH Aachen VL - Dissertation CY - Aachen M1 - RWTH-2016-00851 SP - 1 Online-Ressource (149 Seiten) : Illustrationen PY - 2016 N1 - Veröffentlicht auf dem Publikationsserver der RWTH Aachen University N1 - Dissertation, RWTH Aachen, 2016 AB - This doctoral thesis compares the theories of both René Descartes and António Damásio regarding their examination of the mind-body problem. The pivotal question of the mind-body problem is how mental states behave to physical states. René Descartes represents an interactional dualism looking at body and mind as different entities on the one hand, but also positing a relationship between body and mind on the other. Damásio criticizes Descartes’ dualism based on his knowledge of modern neuroscience. He militates against a disjunction of body and mind: according to Damásio the body forms a frame of reference for all neuronal processes, which in conjunction produce consciousness. Whereas both scientists differ in their personal and professional background, they resemble each other in their critical attitude towards the science of their time, their reforming efforts, and their habit of publishing for both a professional and popular audience. As regards objective targets, theoretical parameters and manner of reasoning both scientists vary considerably from each other: Descartes intends to revolutionize all sciences by creating a methodic, universally valid fundamental concept. Damásios aim is changes in therapeutic concepts in western medicine. In his investigations Descartes works on a metaphysical and epistemological level and stands for an exclusive and hypothetic dualism, which should be considered as ideal and hypothetic. Damásio in contrast works on an empirical and experimental level. Damásio does not engage in a direct discussion of Descartes’ argument; Damásio instead limits his reasoning to a criticism of dualism and does not observe the supplement “interactional”. He directs his criticism not only at Descartes, but also at society, especially the medical fraternity. Damásio does not appropriately correct the “error”, furthermore he steps out of his own scientific field by using neurobiological determinism of the human mind to falsify Descartes’ experiment of fundamental principles. Complex questions as the mind-body problem cannot be resolved by an accusation of error based on weak reasoning. They cannot be resolved through one discipline alone. Therefore their development is in need of an interdisciplinary, constructive collaboration following universal standards. LB - PUB:(DE-HGF)11 UR - https://publications.rwth-aachen.de/record/567603 ER -