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@PHDTHESIS{Schaefer:63830,
author = {Schaefer, Karen Antonia},
othercontributors = {Lorz, Oliver},
title = {{T}emporäre {M}igration - {E}in {W}eg für {E}uropa?},
address = {Aachen},
publisher = {Publikationsserver der RWTH Aachen University},
reportid = {RWTH-CONV-125245},
pages = {VIII, 205 S. : graph. Darst.},
year = {2011},
note = {Aachen, Techn. Hochsch., Diss., 2010},
abstract = {Immigration is on top of the European political agenda.
Illegal immigration at the European boarders is a central
issue. The European approach to deal with this problem so
far was to close the boarders and to enhance controls. These
measures did not lead to a decline of the quantity of
illegal immigrants, but to a shift of routes. In recent
years, European politicians recognized that determent does
not change the immigration situation in Southern Europe.
Hence, new approaches towards legal immigration such as
temporary and selective immigration are discussed. These
concepts are the basis for the following analysis. This
thesis identifies a way to deal with illegal Immigration by
applying temporary and selective immigration. On the basis
of existing immigration theories we develop an economic
model to demonstrate the functionality of temporary
migration. The incentives of the migrants are essential for
the parameters of the model. The incentive to leave right on
time to the home country is supported by a monetary
incentive. In the model legal migration is possible on a
fixed-term visa, while it is not possible to migrate without
this visa. In the initial situation there is only illegal
immigration. The model explains the constraints for a
working concept of temporary immigration. We find that the
capital market conditions for immigrants are crucial. The
results show that the implementation of temporary
immigration is feasible if the return of the migrants is
supported financially. There is a simultaneous discourse on
the European level about controlling illegal migration and
the implementation of temporary immigration as well as about
desirable migration of qualified migrants. This work
analyses both aspects in one model. To do so we combine the
model of temporary migration with a selection approach. This
approach generates a selection of qualified and unqualified
migrants after a probation period. The selection instruments
are a tax on working income and a monetary bond for leaving
the country. The migrants differ in their working
productivity. The analysis of both political targets of the
EU, reducing illegal migration through temporary migration
and increasing the immigration of qualified migrants, leads
to an efficient solution for both objectives. Asymmetric
information about the working productivity can be reduced
through monitoring during probation period and monetary
incentives. Permanent immigration of qualified migrants is
feasible via the right choice of incentive instruments. The
firms can employ the desired quantity of migrants for an
unrestricted time and the other migrants have the incentive
to go home due to the monetary bond for leaving. The work´s
aim is to determine a concept to solve the situation of
illegal migration; the introduced approaches can be designed
to reduce risks and costs for migrants and the destination
countries. Legal migration can be an instrument to combat
refugee disasters. In combination with a selective approach
it is possible to reduce the shortage of skilled workers in
certain sectors. The conclusion for the EU is to examine
these two migration issues together to find a combined
solution and concept.},
keywords = {Migration (SWD) / Internationale Migration (SWD)},
cin = {814320},
ddc = {330},
cid = {$I:(DE-82)814320_20140620$},
typ = {PUB:(DE-HGF)11},
urn = {urn:nbn:de:hbz:82-opus-34980},
url = {https://publications.rwth-aachen.de/record/63830},
}
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