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%0 Thesis %A Reicher-Marek, Maria Elisabeth %T Kontingente Abstrakta. Zur Ontologie und Logik fiktiver Gegenstände [Diplomarbeit, Graz, Univ., 1995] %I Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz %V Diplomarbeit %C Graz %M RWTH-2024-00118 %P 136 Seiten %D 1995 %Z Zweitveröffentlicht auf dem Publikationsserver der RWTH Aachen University 2024 %Z Diplomarbeit, Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, 1995 %X The central question of this paper is: Do fictitious objects exist, and if so, what is their ontological status? The starting point is the observation that we accept many sentences as true in which, at least in appearance, properties are attributed to fictitious objects. At the beginning, two reductionist strategies are discussed, namely: 1. the paraphrasing strategy; 2. the ïnnocence thesis", i.e. the thesis that it is possible to accept sentences about objects without being ontologically committed to the acceptance of these objects. Both approaches are rejected. A distinction is made between fictional discourse and discourse about fictions. Fictions are (usually) created through speech acts; the speech acts that serve the creation of a fiction belong to fictional discourse. In fictional discourse, the sentences have no truth value and the names do not denote anything. In discourse about fictions, on the other hand, the sentences are true or false and names are used referentially. A theory of fictional objects is developed, the most important theses of which are as follows: Fictitious objects exist. They are abstract individuals (abstract in the sense of non-material), on a par with stories, symphonies and other artefacts that have temporal but not spatial existence. The main problem of any non-reductionist theory of fictitious objects is that many truths about fictitious objects conflict with truths concerning reality. This problem is solved by distinguishing two kinds of predication: fictitious objects can stand in two different relations to properties; they can either exemplify or encode properties. The theory is applied to a number of much-discussed problems: What individuates fictional objects? Are there real objects in fictions? Are fictional objects logically incomplete? Can fictional objects be admired, pitied and loved? The following theses are defended: Fictional objects are completely individuated by their ïnternal" properties, i.e. by those properties that they encode. There are no real objects in fictions; there are only fictional objects that are based on real objects. Fictional objects are complete. One can admire and love fictional objects - as fictional objects. They cannot be pitied, despised or feared, except in the state of ïmmersion" in a fiction. %F PUB:(DE-HGF)10 %9 Diploma Thesis %R 10.18154/RWTH-2024-00118 %U https://publications.rwth-aachen.de/record/976279