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@MASTERSTHESIS{ReicherMarek:976279,
author = {Reicher-Marek, Maria Elisabeth},
othercontributors = {Haller, Rudolf},
title = {{K}ontingente {A}bstrakta. {Z}ur {O}ntologie und {L}ogik
fiktiver {G}egenstände [{D}iplomarbeit, {G}raz, {U}niv.,
1995]},
school = {Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz},
type = {Diplomarbeit},
address = {Graz},
reportid = {RWTH-2024-00118},
pages = {136 Seiten},
year = {1995},
note = {Zweitveröffentlicht auf dem Publikationsserver der RWTH
Aachen University 2024; Diplomarbeit,
Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, 1995},
abstract = {The central question of this paper is: Do fictitious
objects exist, and if so, what is their ontological status?
The starting point is the observation that we accept many
sentences as true in which, at least in appearance,
properties are attributed to fictitious objects. At the
beginning, two reductionist strategies are discussed,
namely: 1. the paraphrasing strategy; 2. the "innocence
thesis", i.e. the thesis that it is possible to accept
sentences about objects without being ontologically
committed to the acceptance of these objects. Both
approaches are rejected. A distinction is made between
fictional discourse and discourse about fictions. Fictions
are (usually) created through speech acts; the speech acts
that serve the creation of a fiction belong to fictional
discourse. In fictional discourse, the sentences have no
truth value and the names do not denote anything. In
discourse about fictions, on the other hand, the sentences
are true or false and names are used referentially. A theory
of fictional objects is developed, the most important theses
of which are as follows: Fictitious objects exist. They are
abstract individuals (abstract in the sense of
non-material), on a par with stories, symphonies and other
artefacts that have temporal but not spatial existence. The
main problem of any non-reductionist theory of fictitious
objects is that many truths about fictitious objects
conflict with truths concerning reality. This problem is
solved by distinguishing two kinds of predication:
fictitious objects can stand in two different relations to
properties; they can either exemplify or encode properties.
The theory is applied to a number of much-discussed
problems: What individuates fictional objects? Are there
real objects in fictions? Are fictional objects logically
incomplete? Can fictional objects be admired, pitied and
loved? The following theses are defended: Fictional objects
are completely individuated by their "internal" properties,
i.e. by those properties that they encode. There are no real
objects in fictions; there are only fictional objects that
are based on real objects. Fictional objects are complete.
One can admire and love fictional objects - as fictional
objects. They cannot be pitied, despised or feared, except
in the state of "immersion" in a fiction.},
ddc = {100},
typ = {PUB:(DE-HGF)10},
doi = {10.18154/RWTH-2024-00118},
url = {https://publications.rwth-aachen.de/record/976279},
}
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